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Abstract
Transhumanists contend that enhancing the human brain—a subfield of human enhancement
called cognitive enhancement—is both a crucial and desirable pursuit, supporting the
cultivation of a better world. The discussion thus far has almost entirely focused on cognitive
enhancement through genetic engineering and pharmaceuticals, both of which fall within the
realm of medicine and are thus subject to restrictive policies for both ethical development
and distribution. This thesis argues that cognitive enhancement through brain-computer
interfacing (BCI), despite being considered like any other form of cognitive enhancement, is
developing outside of medical ethics, and is on track to avoid myriad legal and ethical
regulations that other cognitive enhancements will ultimately face. Transhumanists and their
opponents ignore the unique ethical dilemmas BCIs present, and are too enthralled in
conceptual theories of the future to take notice of the ways BCIs are developing today, and
fail to engage with any practical ethical deliberation.
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Introduction
I entered into the whole idea of human enhancement about a year ago when I started
watching Channel 4’s critically acclaimed series Black Mirror. One particular episode of
the show, called The Entire History of You, envisioned a near future where humans
implanted tiny computers inside themselves and recorded everything they saw. People
could replay video footage of their life at any time; share the video footage with others;
relive in perfect detail any moment of their life. It got me thinking, “What if people
actually started putting computers into their brains? What if this becomes a reality?” It
seemed like complete science fiction at the time, but as I started looking into it, I found
out it had already started. I became enthralled with the idea of enhancing human
capabilities.
It would be nearly impossible to research human enhancement without stumbling
into transhumanism, which is where I originally started this thesis. The idea that humans
could use technology to become stronger, smarter, and live longer is very attractive—
seductive even. If even 6 months ago someone asked me if I considered myself a
transhumanist, I would have enthusiastically said “yes.” Despite the way many people
rolled their eyes at transhumanism, I took it quite seriously. Transhumanist arguments
were a breath of fresh air to me, since I had spent some five years at that point in
academia, always looking at all the problems of things. School had taught me any cultural
product, technology, ideology, should be treated with caution, and the best way to get a
good mark was to pick apart all of the downsides and negative aspects. I was relieved to
find a group of scholars who fervently supported technology, and seemed to have
sensible arguments and evidence to back up their beliefs. However, as time passed, I
couldn’t help but see the cracks in their arguments.
In this thesis I survey as much of the debate over enhancing human beings as
possible, particularly focusing on what is generally referred to as cognitive enhancement:
using artificial means to amplify, supplement, or otherwise augment the way human
brains access and interpret information; communicate with other living beings or
technologies; and utilize critical and analytical skills. Transhumanists argue that
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cognitive enhancement has the potential to revolutionize human thought, and it is a noble
pursuit—if humans have greater cognitive capacities, they have greater potential to
innovate new technologies and ideas that can increase quality of life for the entirety of
the human race. Bioconservatives disagree, as they believe those who enhance
themselves are just as likely to use these technologies selfishly, which could worsen
social, environmental, political, and economic matters. From their view, it is better to err
on the side of caution and avoid human enhancement as much as possible. Other groups,
many of which simply do not identify as openly with one ideology or another, chime into
the debate. As I will show, what unifies most of these groups is that most arguments have
considerable ethical implications, which largely go undiscussed.
I use several key terms consistently throughout this thesis. The term enhancement
is used to broadly categorize any and all technologies that allow humans to extend their
1

natural capacities. Cognitive enhancement is then any technology that specifically
relates to pushing the capacities of the human brain, and much like the word
enhancement, it is a very broad term, but will generally refer to three primary
technologies: genetic engineering, pharmaceuticals, and brain-computer interfaces
(BCIs). I specifically deal with BCIs as a means of cognitive enhancement, and this term
is used to refer to a number of both existing and theoretical devices. This includes devices
that are implanted inside the brain, as well as external ones, but they share one common
function: they allow the human brain to interact with and control external devices and
systems solely through brain activity. These are described in greater detail in Chapter
Two. Transhumanism is, as indicated by the title of this thesis, central to my arguments,
and the most basic definition is that through the development and use of emerging
2

technologies, human minds and bodies can be deliberately augmented to improve quality
of life in a number of ways. Transhumanism often is discussed in conjunction with
‘posthumanism,’ a far more contested word. Posthumanism refers to two different
schools of thought, the first being that transhumanism will lead to a posthuman species,

1

Even defining what constitutes a ‘natural’ capacity is an immense discussion, which both chapter one and
three will at times wrestle with.
2
Which includes but is not limited to genetic engineering, BCIs, life extension technologies,
nanotechnologies, a variety of biotechnologies, and artificially intelligent machines.
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which is distinctly different from humans as they exist today. It is unclear what a
posthuman may look like, or how a posthuman may act, but it is clear that they will
definitively be different. The second definition of posthumanism emphasizes an
exploration of what might come after humanism. This second definition is far more
philosophical, and not a major focus of this thesis. It is however important to note that the
transhumanist vision of posthumanism is not an abandonment of humanism, but rather
and intensification of humanism.
Chapter One outlines the current landscape of the debate and what has lead up to
it, and will discuss the great complexity of the issue of enhancing human brains,
regardless of the type of enhancement technology at issue. Chapter Two narrows the
scope down to cognitive enhancement via brain-computer interfacing, an emerging field
that allows human brains to control electronic devices directly, without using any other
part of the body or requiring outside assistance. This chapter looks at the history of
innovations in science and technology that led to current BCIs and how they are being
used today. Despite sounding like science fiction, people have been experimenting with
controlling various electronic devices and systems through both implanted and noninvasive technologies for some time now, and with great success. The chapter concludes
by examining the aspirations of current BCI design, in order to open up to the future of
BCI enhancement and the ethical considerations that arise. Chapter Three uncovers the
ethical assumptions and arguments that the main groups engaged in debate over cognitive
enhancement are making, and reveals the shortcomings in both transhumanist and
bioconservative ethics. I will argue that both sides have made a major assumption, that
BCI cognitive enhancements warrant the same ethical considerations as any other form of
cognitive enhancement, namely genetic engineering and pharmaceutical use. A large
portion of BCI development is within the realms of engineering and computer science,
not medicine, and thus is excluded from the most serious and influential ethical
evaluations. BCI enhancement is not considered either through legal or policy
frameworks that might control such technology and avoid numerous detrimental
outcomes from its misuse. Cognitive enhancement via BCI demands separate attention in
order to receive proper ethical reflection, which is simply not happening anywhere,
especially not amongst transhumanists and their opponents.

4

Despite having considerable reservations about transhumanism, I don’t think
transhumanism and pro-enhancement ideologies should be treated with knee-jerk
hostility, which seems to be how many people react when I even say the word
“transhumanism.” I think transhumanists have interesting points to make, even if they are
a bit too one-sided and overly hopeful. I don’t think every author should be responsible
for fully encapsulating all sides to a debate in their writing, as that’s what debate is all
about: people from different standpoints come together to hash out the issues.
Transhumanism should not be taken as the definitive voice on cognitive enhancement,
but rather as one legitimate side. All opinions and arguments in the entirety of the debate
should be considered, which is what I spend much of this thesis doing. Human
enhancement—and in particular cognitive enhancement—is a vastly complex issue, and
deserves careful consideration. There are a multitude of groups involved in debating
cognitive enhancement, from transhumanists and bioconservatives, to medical doctors,
scientists, and philosophers. My issue is not that any one side is particularly weak or
unfounded, but rather all sides are missing a crucial detail: brain-computer interfacing is
quite different from other forms of cognitive enhancement, and it is quickly slipping
through the cracks, avoiding major ethical evaluation and regulation, which I argue it so
desperately needs. Transhumanists and bioconservatives are the loudest groups at
debating cognitive enhancement, and so it’s important to see how cognitive enhancement
is being portrayed, and the types of issues being discussed. By exploring what’s
happening in the debate over enhancement, and looking to the types of brain-computer
interfaces in use and in development, I hope to bring to light some of the glaring ethical
problems with lumping brain-computer interfacing with other forms of cognitive
enhancement.

5
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Transhumanism and Cognitive Enhancement
In the broadest and most straightforward sense, to enhance human beings
is to expand their capabilities—to enable them to do what normal human
beings have hitherto not been able to. Understood this way, enhancement
is ubiquitous in human history.
—Allen Buchanan
I think, ever since Darwin, we haven’t had any basis for saying that
there’s any biological limit on what we could be, should be, or might want
to become.
—Arthur Caplan

1.1

History of Transhumanism

The earliest transhumanist aspirations—of deliberately altering the human body and mind
in the pursuit of transcending suffering, sickness and death, achieving altered states of
consciousness, and even attaining ‘superpowers’—are rooted in ancient literature and
religious texts.3,4 Even today, the basis of enhancement is a desire to improve upon one’s
own life, as well as the lives and conditions of others, can be found in religion, as “every
religion on the planet sees the improvement of the self and one’s children as a moral
obligation.”5 Whether these religions approve of biomedical, genetic and electronic
enhancements is an altogether different question, but the foundation of transhumanist
thinking is a fundamental human desire to improve. Don Ihde points out that over time,
and particularly after the Enlightenment, ‘superpowers’ like fast travel, the ability to
change form, levitate or psychic powers, which were all once found in ancient literature,
moved from being imagined as super-natural, organic or animal-like towards being based
in technology, most notably in the form of speculative science fiction.6
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Don Ihde, “On Which Human Are We Post?,” in H ±: Transhumanism and Its Critics, ed. Gregory R.
Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 2011). 125
4
James Hughes, Citizen Cyborg: Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the
Future (Cambridge, MA: Westview, 2004). 156
5
Arthur Caplan quoted in Simon Young, Designer Evolution: A Transhumanist Manifesto (Amherst, NY:
Prometheus, 2006). 51
6
Ihde, “Of Which Human Are We Post?”125
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Humanism, as it still exists today, became cemented during the European
Renaissance and the Enlightenment between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries; a
philosophy founded in encouraging “human beings to rely on empirical observations,
reason and the scientific method, rather than religious tradition and authority.”7 Alongside
the increased reliance on science came a revolution in agriculture during the mideighteenth century, which allowed large populations to overcome the effects of undernutrition and to facilitate greater neurological development.8 As humans rapidly altered
their bodies, minds and ways of living through industrialized farming and mass
production of goods, traditional views of human evolution changed as well. In 1859
Darwin published Origin of Species, a text that confronted the view that human beings in
their current form were a unique, biologically-fixed race by demonstrating that “humanity
as it currently exists is one step along an evolutionary path of development.”9 The
developed world began to understand that human beings had evolved from earlier species
in an ongoing evolution.
As science and medicine flourished, the idea of extending human capabilities
beyond therapy began to take root. Elizer Metchnikoff, a Russian scientist who received
the Nobel Prize for Physiology and Medicine for identifying the function of white blood
cells, proposed that removing a significant portion of the large intestine would greatly
increase the duration of a person’s life. Metchnikoff proposed that science could not only
heal the human body, but it could extend it beyond the natural boundaries of biology,10
arguably the first scientific suggestion resembling contemporary transhumanism.
Unfortunately, Metchnikoff’s proposed intestinal removal was not as successful as hoped,
beginning what would be a series of adverse developments in transhumanist thinking and
practice.

7

Hughes, Citizen Cyborg. 157
Allen E. Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement (New York: Oxford UP,
2011). 39
9
Max More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” in The Transhumanist Reader, ed. Max More and
Natasha Vita-More (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 10
10
Greg Klerkx, “The Transhumanists as Tribe,” in Better Humans? The Politics of Human Enhancement
and Life Extension, ed. Paul Miller and James Wilsdon (London: Demos, 2006), 60
8
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In the 1923, J.B.S. Haldane first imagined genetic enhancement with the
publication of Daedalus, Science and the Future in which he saw science deliberately
merging with evolutionary biology in order to control the future of humanity.11 In 1927,
Julian Huxley—Aldous Huxley’s brother—would be the first to use the term
transhumanism when he wrote,
The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself—not just
sporadically, an individual here in one way, an individual there in another
way, but in its entirety, as humanity. We need a new word for this new
belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve: man remaining man, but
transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human
nature.12
Huxley envisioned a world where arts and science would merge to alleviate the ‘crisis of
humanity’13 but his dream for the future was primarily concerned with biological
boundaries and weaknesses within the confines of humanist thinking. His statement of
‘man remaining man’ would later summarize two sides of a debate on posthumanity:
does ‘remaining man’ indicate retaining humanist values while biologically changing, or
discarding humanism in favor of a variety of other philosophies, or something else
entirely? These questions would later emerge in the mid 1970s amongst philosophers.14
In the 1920’s & 30s, scientists—the most famous of which were the ‘red’
scientists of Cambridge University—began to work on technologies that would allow us
to deliberately alter the genetic foundations of human life, and more specifically, to
remove undesirable traits in exchange for more beneficial ones15—a field of science that
has infamously become known as eugenics. The academic eugenics movement of the
early 1930’s quickly became tarnished by a different eugenics movement lead by the
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Nick Bostrom, “A History of Transhumanist Thought,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 14, no. 1
(April 2005). 5
12
Huxley qtd. in Hughes, Citizen Cyborg. 158
13
Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “Engaging Transhumanism,” in H ±: Transhumanism and Its Critics, ed.
Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 2011), 20
14
see Neil Badmington, ed. Posthumanism. Readers in Cultural Criticism. Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000. for a
collection of foundational essays.
15
Tirosh-Samuelson, “Engaging Transhumanism.” 22
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Nazi party during WWII, which effectively discredited eugenics.16 In addition, Julian
Huxley’s brother Aldous published Brave New World, which, coupled with the antigenetic tampering mentality of the time, became a beacon for discouraging any serious
development of human-enhancing technologies, genetic, biological, pharmaceutical or
otherwise.17 This is not to say eugenics were discarded, as examples throughout the 20th
century demonstrate State-imposed sterilization and selective breeding; rather, eugenics
as a means of improving quality of life by preventing disease and biological weakness
was seen by the public as something unnatural, dangerous, and altogether unwanted.
Thus the early incarnations of transhumanism were contained to science fiction
until the mid 20th century, when a group of philosophers took up debating the end of
humanism, and the possibility of the emergence of a new species—the posthuman. In
1973 Foucault published The Order Of Things in which he demonstrates that the very
concept of ‘Man,’ an autonomous, rational being, only first emerged in 16th century
Europe, and suggested that ‘Man,’ may very well be nearing an end.18 While futurists
saw this as meaning the end of our biological constraints, philosophers took this to mean
that the humanist philosophy might too be nearing an end.19,20 A debate opened
concerning posthumanism, the concept that human beings could soon be replaced by
biologically-enhanced, mechanized or otherwise non-human species, where scholars like
Baudrillard and Lyotard discussed the possibility of the end of human life and the
emergence of a new philosophy that may replace humanism. These philosophers were
predominantly concerned with how thought itself could or should change in order to
usher in a new-age philosophy, one that was admittedly difficult to imagine due to the

16

Ibid.
Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002). 6-7 – Fukuyama argues Brave New World was a warning as to the likely
outcome of tampering with human biology; in contrast, Kurzweil believes Brave New World was a warning
of how not to approach human enhancement, rather than outright opposing it. Bostrom argues that Brave
New World is a “tragedy of technology and social engineering being used to deliberately cripple moral and
intellectual capacties—the exact opposite of the transhumanist proposal.”
18
Foucault, “The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences.” 387, cited in Ihde, “Of Which
Human Are We Post?”123
19
Cary Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010). xii
20
Ihde, “Of Which Human Are We Post?”123
17
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fact that they believed posthumans would be intellectually superior to humans and thus
more capable of forming such a philosophy. As a result, envisioning the posthuman
future, one where our capacities for new thoughts and experiences are far beyond our
current capacities, remains highly speculative.21
Among these philosophers was Donna Haraway, who in 1985 published The
Cyborg Manifesto, a document that merged posthumanist thinking with science in order
to alter the human body and mind simultaneously, thus creating the subset of
posthumanism that would later be called transhumanism. Haraway’s manifesto, which
particularly looks at gender and sex in an age of mechanized bodies, expanded upon
earlier work from Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline. In 1960, Clynes and Kline
proposed that for humans to best survive space travel, rather than altering the
environment to suit human life, it might be better to alter the human body to suit the
harsh environment of space.22 They imagined a merging of the human body with machine
parts, and that the result would be a called a cyborg: a cybernetic organism. Cybernetics
dates back earlier to John von Neumann and Norbert Weiner, who suggested that
technology look to the way the human body maintains equilibrium via negative feedback,
and to base technologies upon the human body. Haraway took the concept of the cyborg,
which until then had been a theoretical response to a future problem, and placed it within
the realm of cultural philosophy. In the following decades, cyborgism would evolve into
the contemporary debate on transhumanism, human enhancement technologies, and the
blurring of human and machine.
Much of transhumanism is a response to scientific advancements, theories and
forecasts from the late 20th century. In 1970, Minsky conceptualized an age where
superintelligent machines roamed the earth, founding a subset of computer science geared
towards achieving artificial intelligence.23 In 1972, scientists began experimenting with

21

Nick Bostrom, “Why I Want to Be a Posthuman When I Grow Up,” in The Transhumanist Reader, ed.
Max More and Natasha Vita-More (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 32
22
Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline, “Cyborgs and Space,” in The Cyborg Handbook, ed. Chris
Hables Gray (New York: Routledge, 1995), 29–34.
23
More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism.” 11
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what would become contemporary genetic engineering.24 At the same time, computer
science began to study possible ways the brain might be able to control external
devices.25 With the sudden surge of real-life technologies that promised to enhance
human capacities came a generation of fictional representations of the cyborg; Steve
Austin in the Six Million Dollar Man and Jaime Sommers in Bionic Woman put a positive
outlook on the merging of human and machine, showing the cyborg as maintaining their
humanity, morals and personality after enhancement.26 Out of the emerging trends in
scientific and technological development came bioethics, a body of ethical discussion
concerning altering the human body through artificial means. U.S. President Jimmy
Carter legitimized bioethics and the possibility for human enhancement in the late 1970s
with the first executive-level bioethics commission, The President’s Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.27 The
1970s were a turnaround for human enhancement technologies, legitimizing research and
philosophical discussions as to their likelihood and social impacts, while the 1980s would
problematize the situation. Due to pressure from anti-abortion lobbyists, Carter’s
Commission on bioethics was disbanded, and Presidents Reagan and Bush Sr. were
unable—or simply refused—to form their own commissions.28
In 1972, F.M. Esfanfiary (later known as FM-2030) began what some see as the
second wave of transhumanism29 by suggesting that transforming humans into
posthumans by modifying both the body and then mind through artificial means could
very well yield a myriad of positive effects.30 In 1989, FM-2030 published Are You
Transhuman?, a book that suggested that humans as we currently exist are already in a
transitional period towards being posthuman, and that like our early hominid ancestors,

24

Ramez Naam, More Than Human: Embracing the Promise of Biological Enhancement (New York:
Broadway, 2005).13
25
Anders Sandberg, “Cognition Enhancement: Upgrading the Brain,” in Enhancing Human Capacities, ed.
Julian Savulescu, Ruud Ter Meulen, and Guy Kahane (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011), 76
26
Hughes, Citizen Cyborg. 100
27
Ibid., 61
28
Ibid.
29
Klerkx, “The Transhumanists as Tribe.” 62
30
More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism.” 4
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we are generally unaware of our role in evolution.31 In the following year, Max More
(who changed his name from O’Connor to More to demonstrate the transhumanist desire
for continual improvement)

32

founded Extropianism, a libertarian way of approaching

human enhancement technologies that focused on individual rights, democracy, freemarket consumer-based enhancements and the pursuit of continual improvement for the
entirety of the human race. More went on to lead a series of Extropian conventions,
called Extro, which heard from the likes of Moravec, Drexler, and Kurzweil, among a
range of other philosophers, sociologists and computer scientists. Many of these early
technology prophets, including Minsky, Ettinger and Hayles, have been foundational to
transhumanist philosophies and practices, particularly in rationally predicting future
technologies and their effects.33 More’s extropianism separated from the more general
transhumanist movement by incorporating libertarian politics and anarcho-capitalist
sentiment into their basic principles,34 and was predominantly comprised of welleducated, wealthy men.35 Transhumanism, as a collective of like-minded individuals
rather than any formal organization, began as a much more radical set of beliefs
compared to the more cautious attitudes of tranhumanists today; this is not to say these
individuals have disappeared, or that their views been excluded from the contemporary
debate, but that for the most part the majority of those involved in human enhancement
are more cautionary and in favor of the identifying the ambiguous nature of these
technologies, rather than the strong faith in technological benefits that extropians once
had.
After a 12-year absence of Presidentially commissioned bioethics discussion,
President Clinton founded the Presidential Bioethics Advisory Commission in 1993,
which was comprised of a broad range of academics, scientists, and business and industry
leaders.36 Human enhancement had begun to take a permanent foothold in political and

31

Hughes, Citizen Cyborg. 161
Ibid., 165
33
Ibid., 163-164
34
Ibid., 165
35
Ibid., 72
36
Ibid., 62
32
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cultural discussions. In 1997, Nick Bostrom founded the World Transhumanist
Association—later renamed H+—going off many of the founding principles of
extropianism. However, Bostrom saw extropianism as too radically libertarian and too
readily ignoring the possibilities for enhancement technologies to do harm. In response,
Bostrom proposed that to ensure the best use of technology and human enhancement is to
examine as carefully as possible both the negatives and positives—as well as the
ambiguous attributes in-between—and to enter transhumanism into public debate.
Bostrom saw that democracy was crucial to properly using human enhancement, and that
governments would need to acknowledge their legitimacy and to regulate their use,
without impeding individual rights to one’s own body. In 2000, More revised part of the
extropian manifesto to be more closely tied to transhumanism, by denouncing radical
free-market consumerism and unregulated innovation with regard to enhancement
technologies, and instead suggested that some formal order be put in place to ensure
equal access to enhancement technologies.37 Despite growing discussion over
enhancement, coupled with innovations in science and technology, N. Katherine Hayles
wrote How We Became Posthuman, where she contends that transhumanism was a
passing fad, and that the technologies discussed were nothing more than fantasy. With
radical expansions in science, medicine, and computer science, particularly after to the
decoding of the human genome in the early 2000’s,38 biotechnologies and speculative
nanotechnologies not only became more plausible, but at a rate much sooner than early
science fiction had speculated. As a result, there was an exponential increase in
transhumanist thinking and literature in the 21st century, forcing Hayles to dismiss her
earlier criticisms of transhumanism.39
However, at the beginning of the 21st century, the growing body of transhumanists
and human enhancement hopefuls faced strong opposition when the Bush administration
made considerable staff cuts to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, which was

37

Ibid., 168
Klerkx, “The Transhumanists as Tribe.” 65
39
Katherine Hayles, “Wrestling With Transhumanism,” in H ±: Transhumanism and Its Critics, ed.
Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 2011), 215
38
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subsequently moved outside of the White House,40 and replaced Clinton’s Bioethics
Commission with Bush’s own President’s Council on Bioethics. Unlike Clinton’s diverse
commission, Bush’s council was largely onesided, comprised entirely of radical
conservatives. Bush appointed Leon Kass to head the council, “a political conservative
with a twenty-five year history of opposing infertility treatments, cosmetic surgery, organ
transplantation, and other technologies that, in his view, violate the natural order of
things.”41 Kass built the committee primarily with known Christian conservative
bioethicists, including Mary Ann Glendon and Gilbert Meilander, “and conservatives
with little to no connection to academic bioethics, such as Robert George, Francis
Fukuyama, James Q. Wilson and Charles Krauthammer,”42 whose first line of business
was recommending that the use of embryos in stem cell research, as well as cloning, be
banned and criminalized. In 2003, the council published Beyond Therapy, a foundational
document for anti-enhancement advocates, which featured an article on the ‘wisdom of
repugnance,’ more commonly referred to as the ‘yuck factor’, which states, “If a practice
is scary or repugnant, that is sufficient grounds to ban it.”43 As many transhumanists and
those engaged in discussing the enhancement debate have noted, Kass’ ‘yuck factor’ was
founded in vague, misleading rhetoric that proposed that federal laws and institutions
judge emerging technologies based solely on knee-jerk reactions.44 For the better part of
the 2000s, Kass’ council was the most influential roadblock for transhumanists. With
such strong opposition from the U.S. government, the stage for the current debates
concerning enhancement was set.

1.2

Contemporary Transhumanism

Transhumanism as it exists today was first defined in 1990 when Max More wrote,
“Transhumanism is a class of philosophies that seek to guide us towards a posthuman
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condition.”45 Transhumanism, however, has dual meanings, in that it can be seen as both
transhuman-ism, and trans-humanism, the former being a broad categorization of
philosophies and technologies that encompass enhancing human capacities and
capabilities beyond their current limits, the latter ‘transhumanism’ is on the other hand
much more contested. For some, transhumanism is a combining of humanist thinking
with technological development in a conscious effort towards a posthuman state; this
transhumanism definition relies on a simple humanism definition that “humans should
exercise their powers of reason to control and improve their lives.”46,47
However, what the posthuman era encompasses divides into two bodies of
thought. On one hand, some philosophers see it as simply an era when enhanced bodies
and minds have extended human capabilities to the point that they can no longer be
categorized as the same species as those who are unenhanced.48 On the other hand, some
see the posthuman era as having more to do with discarding the problematic aspects of
humanism. Moravec suggested a posthuman future where brains may be uploaded to
nonbiological devices, which Hayles criticizes as being characteristically not posthuman,
in that Moravec “is not abandoning the autonomous liberal subject but is expanding its
prerogative into the realm of the posthuman.”49 Wolfe points out that transhumanism is
an intensification of humanism, while posthumanism opposes humanism50;
transhumanism carries forward humanist philosophy, while the vision of a posthuman
world abandons it.51 Wolfe indicates that animal cruelty and inequality among humans
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are in fact products of humanist thinking—that humanism proposes suppressing
biological, instinctual and otherwise ‘animalistic’ urges in order to pursue reason, science
and knowledge, and in doing so, allows for humans to justify treating other living beings,
animal or human, as inferior.52 From Wolfe’s perspective, transhumanism only
intensifies these justifications by suggesting human minds are capable of transcending
their biological bodies, and that doing so would be an improvement on our present
condition. It should be noted that Wolfe’s definition of transhumanism is not widely
discussed among transhumanists, as his work is geared more towards the late 20th century
discussion on posthumanism than it is applicable to the contemporary debate on emerging
enhancements.
Early posthumanist philosophers, like Wolfe, Lyotard and Baudrillard, are rarely
mentioned in the current enhancement debate. While their work may be foundational,
current trends are much more geared towards how actual technologies, both ones that
currently exist as well as ones that can reasonably be predicted to occur in the near future,
will have an effect on society. Max More even goes as far to dismiss early technology
futurists like Moravec, Minsky and Kurzweil as being irrelevant to the concerns of
transhumanists today.53 Whether More’s dismissal is representative of the transhumanist
community at large is difficult to know, but it would seem that these theorists are often
(mistakenly) seen as representative of transhumanism—Kurzweil outright rejects the
label as a transhumanist, and transhumanists generally find him to be too technologically
deterministic; he is however, often labeled as a transhumanist. Furthermore, while
‘cyborg’ was at one point a buzzword related to the enhancement debate, transhumanists
“generally look down on the cyborg concept as primitive and unhelpful,”54 suggesting
that representations of cyborgs do not encapsulate the way the contemporary debate
envisions enhancements—as primarily being ubiquitous, unobtrusive and conceivably
impossible to detect.
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Instead, transhumanists see the ‘transhuman’ as being short for ‘transitional
human.’ While some see humans as always being involved in evolutionary transition,
transhumanists acknowledge that humanity stands for the first time at a point where we
can collectively use emerging technologies to deliberately modify our biology, our bodies
and our minds, in order to alleviate suffering—both current and future—and to better
equip ourselves and our children to address societal and environmental issues.55
Transhumanists acknowledge that natural evolution is faulted, in that “the human
organism is not a finely balanced whole, because evolution does not create harmonious,
‘complete’ organisms; instead it produces tentative, changing, perishing, cobbledtogether ad hoc solutions to transient design problems, with blithe disregard for human
well-being.”56 Consider the appendix: an organ that theoretically once served a purpose
in the human body, but has over the course of natural evolution lost its function.
However, it remains in the body, susceptible to disease—its only current ‘function’ is as a
biological weakness in the human body. Despite those who would argue for intelligent
design and leaving the natural path of evolution alone,57 transhumanists believe that to
embrace artificial modifications to the body is not only crucial to the future of humanity,
but that it is even our obligation to pursue it. Transhumanists also believe in
‘morphological freedom,’ “the view that human enhancement technologies should be
made widely available and that individuals should have broad discretion over which of
these technologies to apply to themselves.”58 Transhumanists also place a high degree of
value on human ‘well-being’ and happiness as being fundamental to evaluating the value
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of human enhancements,59 suggesting transhumanism believes in empowering
autonomous individuals.
Not all of the discussion of human enhancement technologies is labeled
‘transhumanism’—in fact, many academics, scientists and business leaders simply prefer
‘human enhancement technology’ than any label that connotes a philosophical or political
leaning. These authors60 often look to enhancement technologies in relation to therapeutic
technologies, the latter of which encompass any number of medical or electronic
technologies that aim at restoring ‘normal levels’ of functionality to humans. Some
instead divide ‘enhancement’ into ‘conventional enhancements,’ being methods for
improving the human body and mind through education, information technologies,
mental techniques, and common drugs like caffeine or nicotine, and ‘unconventional
enhancements,’ such as implants, pharmaceuticals, genetic engineering, and braincomputer interfaces.61 Bostrom writes,
The boundary between these two categories, however, may increasingly
blur. For instance, neurological health objectives such as maintaining full
cognitive performance into old age, or remedying specific cognitive
deficits such as concentration and memory problems, are likely to become
increasingly hard to distinguish from enhancement objectives as the range
of biomedical interventions expands.62
For Bostrom, among others, the line between therapy and enhancement is slippery, and
acknowledge that technologies intended to restore function are at times likely to be used
to enhance capacities where no deficit exists.63
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Transhumanists largely debate at what point humans will be enhanced sufficiently
enough to be considered posthumans.64 For Buchanan, “Merely enhancing the human
immune system, increasing average IQ by twenty points, and extending life by 50 years
would not produce posthumans,”65 because it is not sufficient a change to call us a new
species. Moreover, he argues these changes must happen on a large-scale, in that if only a
section of the population were to significantly enhance themselves, it could present a
situation of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ and thus a posthuman era had not emerged. Instead,
Buchanan, alongside philosophers like Asher Siedel, imagines the posthuman era
beginning in the distant future66 in contrast to the transhumanists and futurists that see
posthumans emerging within the 21st century.67

1.3

Opposing Enhancement

Transhumanists undoubtedly have a number of opponents, both academic and political,
but it is important to note that “the chief division in the literature on enhancement is not
between ‘pro-enhancement’ and ‘anti-enhancement.’ It is between ‘anti-enhancement’
and ‘anti-anti-enhancement,’…by the ‘anti-anti-enhancement’ stance I mean the view
that enhancement is sometimes permissible.”68 The vast majority of transhumanists see
enhancements as having potential dangers, and encourage exploring those potential
dangers in order to best avoid them. Anyone who advocates for the use of enhancements
regardless of potential risks would ultimately not be a transhumanist, but rather radically
pro-enhancement.
Opposition to human enhancement technologies may have been around for some
time, but it was Francis Fukuyama in 2004 that sparked the greatest objection to
emerging technologies. Fukuyama published a paper in Foreign Policy, in which he
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called transhumanism ‘the most dangerous idea in the world,’ a phrase that has since
become prominent within the human enhancement debate. Fukuyama proposed that
meddling in human biology, particularly through genetic engineering, would result in a
significant loss of human dignity and meaning.69 He expanded his arguments in Our
Posthuman Future, which is among the most-cited anti-enhancement texts. While
Fukuyama is a serious opponent to enhancement, it should be noted his objections are
almost entirely targeted at genetic and biological enhancements, which make up only a
portion of the larger body of enhancements, such as brain-computer interfaces, intelligent
machines, pharmaceuticals and artificial body parts. His arguments have been used to
attack a broad range of enhancements, associating them with negative outcomes and
possibilities, most of which are affiliated with genetic tampering and biomedical
technologies.
Taking Fukuyama’s protests to an extreme, Bill McKibben calls for “a halt on
even the basic scientific research that might lead to techniques to enhance human
abilities. In his book Enough, he writes, ‘We need to do an unlikely thing: we need to
survey the world we now inhabit and proclaim it good. Good enough…Enough
intelligence. Enough capability. Enough.’”70 While McKibben’s proposal to stop
developing even therapeutic technologies is rare among anti-enhancement advocates, his
argument that our current situation is sufficient is common among not only those within
the debate, but also the population at large.71 Bostrom and Ord suggest that many people
are fearful of altering the human mind and body because of what they call a ‘status quo
bias.’ They propose a ‘reversal test,’ where people are asked if instead of extending
capacities, such as life extension, cognitive enhancement or otherwise, if we should work
towards reducing these capacities. While it is obvious that reducing lifespan is irrational,
opponents of enhancement fail to give any explanation as to why our current capacities
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are ideal; when McKibben’s proposal is applied directly to a specific type of
enhancement, such as life extension, Bostrom and Ord note that those in opposition find
it difficult if not impossible to explain why extending life by a single year would be
detrimental.
Prominent transhumanist James Hughes states that opponents to enhancement
“start from the assumption that new biotechnologies are being developed in unethical
ways by a rapacious, patriarchal medical-industrial complex, and will have myriad
unpleasant consequences for society, especially women, the poor and the powerless.”72 In
comparison, transhumanists encourage that these ‘unpleasant consequences’ be flushed
out through carefully analyzing current trends, examining existing inequalities that may
be exacerbated by emerging technologies, and by making informed predictions for the
future; anti-enhancement advocates assume these consequences are more than likely,
regardless of intervention to prevent them. However, opposition comes from both the
political left and right. On the right are primarily religious conservatives, like Fukuyama
and Kass, who argue human enhancement violates basic human nature and disrespects
‘gifts’ that nature has bestowed upon us.73 On the political left however are activists who,
in reacting to corporate-controlled techno-utopianism,74 argue against allowing
corporations to control emerging enhancement technologies. Both libertarian-leaning leftand right-wing proponents have been accused of entirely avoiding any specific definition
of ‘enhancement’ altogether as a way to generalize the opposition,75 indicating a set
critical issues in enhancement debates: a lack of consensus on definitions, unclear
rhetoric from both sides, and misrepresentations of oppositional arguments.
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One of the most problematic aspects of the human enhancement debate is
miscommunication between opposing sides. For Buchanan, much of anti-enhancement
arguments are flimsy and based in ‘murky rhetoric.’76 He argues that allowing such
arguments to be left uncontested could have disastrous effects in that it would allow
populations to be influenced by faulty logic and partial representations of enhancement
technologies, as well as of the transhumanist perspective.77 For example, Miller and
Wilsdon write, “All too easily, [transhumanists] slide from a discussion of what new
technologies may make possible to an assumption that these changes will happen, without
any appreciation of the subtleties of culture and values, or the unpredictable twists and
turns of democracy.”78 Ted Peter elaborates, arguing that deterministic transhumanists
like Simon Young and Kurzweil—neither of which are recognized as transhumanists79—
overlook human inclination to use things selfishly and maliciously.80 Russell Blackford,
editor-in-chief of the Journal of Technology and Evolution, responds to Peters, “It is not
intellectually useful to challenge a specific viewpoint within transhumanism or to
synthesize some composite viewpoint out of the (perhaps conflicting) writings of a few
prominent or not-so-prominent transhumanist thinkers, then attack this—and then claim
to have refuted or discredited transhumanism itself.”81
As I’ve argued earlier, transhumanism explicitly states that one of its goal is to
uncover both positive and negative impacts of enhancement technologies, in order to
accurately present them to the public at large, and to have a truly democratic debate
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concerning their use and regulation. While some early writers like Kurzweil and Moravec
may be deterministic, seeing these technologies as inevitable, they are not transhumanist
authors: transhumanists reject the possibility of any one outcome being inevitable instead
favoring an ongoing discussion regarding the ambiguous nature of technology. Greg
Klerkx, also featured in Miller and Wilsdon’s reader, writes that contemporary
transhumanists “cannot see downsides to these developments, despite ample evidence
that the products of modern science have been used at least as often for harm as for
good,”82 which blatently ignores some of the most basic principles of transhumanism.
Broad generalizations like this hamper open and critical discourse regarding human
enhancement.
Arthur Caplan points out another miscommunication among debaters when he
refers to enhancement critics who claim that transhumanists ‘seek perfection,’83 when
virtually no recognized transhumanist has ever claimed to ‘seek perfection.’ Max More
shares his concern when he writes, “These critics cannot have actually read much
transhumanist writing—certainly not anything written in the last decade,”84 and while he
may exaggerate how uninformed the opposition may be, he does point out that the
various sides of the debate are not operating with an agreed upon set of terms, nor do all
authors acknowledge the legitimacy of their opponents. Buchanan argues that some of the
most outspoken critics of enhancement, including Kass, Fukuyama and Michael Sandel,
repeatedly make vast empirical generalizations about the psychology of
those who pursue enhancement. They assert that to try to enhance is to
strive for total mastery of the conditions of human existence…In this regard,
the enhancement literature is one of the last academic strongholds of a
priori psychology and sociology. One would think that one was living in the
eighteenth century, when serious intellectuals still believed they could
formulate interesting and controversial generalizations about human
behavior or the working of human society from the armchair.85
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It would appear that not only Ted Peters but many in opposition of enhancement
are guilty of targeting a specific aspect of what they perceive to be transhumanism,
discrediting it, and then claiming to have discredited transhumanism as a whole.
However, it is not just those in opposition of enhancement that have come under fire for
misrepresenting the opposing side, as Miller and Wilsdon contend “Hughes occasionally
slips back into the familiar mantras of technohype and determinism. And his call for a
less polarized debate isn’t helped by him labeling all critics of enhancement
‘BioLuddites,’”86 a term that other transhumanists87 have since picked up on.
It is troublesome that within the human enhancement debate, both sides, or rather
all sides, operate at times on false assumptions of their opponents, and that there is no
cohesive set of definitions or terms being discussed. For example, Fukuyama’s book Our
Posthuman Future, while often described as highly alarmist, is almost entirely focused on
genetic engineering, yet its arguments are used as if they attack all types of enhancement
equally. The result is a series of authors discrediting Fukuyama’s writing on genetic
engineering, and then acting as if they’ve discredited all oppositions to human
enhancement. This type of Straw Man argumentation occurs on practically all sides of the
debate, and inhibits productive discussion.
Another major concern among enhancement critics is the concern that an
enhanced human may find less value in things that current humans find beautiful or
interesting.88 Agar argues that enhanced humans may even find romantic relationships to
be increasingly difficult to maintain, as an intellectually enhanced mind may find his or
her partner’s interests to be less and less important than their own; furthermore, if both
partners are equally enhanced, it is likely their interests will have become so specific and
narrow that finding common ground may be next to impossible.89 In response, Bostrom

86

Miller and Wilsdon, “Stronger, Longer, Starter, Faster.” 23
For example, Savulescu, Sandberg, and Kahane, “Well-being and Enhancement” use the term bioLuddite
repeatedly.
88
Nicholas Agar, in Humanity’s End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement (Cambridge, MA: MIT,
2010), 142-3, argues we may find something like Bach’s B-minor Mass to be beautiful still, but our
appreciation for it may diminish with cognitive enhancements.
89
Agar, Humanity’s End. 186-7
87

24

writes “It is not clear why the ability to appreciate what is more complex or subtle should
make it impossible to appreciate simpler things,”90 and goes on to explain that enhanced
cognitive capacities not only do not suggest a loss in one’s previous interests, but that the
opposite may be true: enhanced minds may be more capable of appreciating a wider
range of things that unenhanced minds can.
Regarding the loss of meaning in a posthuman age, Bill McKibben once again
takes an extreme stance when he recollects a childhood friend, Kathy, who at the age of
15 died of complications from cystic fibrosis. He reminisces that Kathy was among the
most kind and generous people he has ever known, arguing that the joy she felt from
things many people take for granted was a result of her illness; for McKibben, suffering
and vulnerability are necessary in order for positive human characteristics to flourish.91
Furthermore, Tirosh-Samuelson contends that a significant portion of all human culture
could not have been possible without human suffering, and that future technologies that
eliminate suffering may usher in a culture-less age.92 For transhumanists, “it seems
obvious that the ethical goal for society should be to make life as fantastic for as many
people as possible, not to valorize pain and suffering.”93 Transhumanists believe that
firstly, by enhancing our bodies to resist disease, to live longer, and to more rapidly heal,
we can diminish the amount of suffering for both individuals as well as collectively.
Furthermore, by enhancing our brains, namely in terms of our ability to recall memory, to
stay alert for longer periods, to more easily understand and analyze information, we will
be better equipped to address long-standing social issues through innovative social
policy.

1.4

Cognitive Enhancement

Many speculate how enhancement technologies will act as an extension of the human
mind, body, and identity. For example, More points out that “As we store more of our
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memories externally and create avatars, it is also becoming increasingly apparent that the
boundaries of the self are unclear and may not be limited to the location of a single
body.”94 While some speculate that future technologies may become internalized as part
of an individual’s identity, Andy Clark argues in Natural-born Cyborgs that humans have
always extended themselves through technology, including basic tools, language and
even thought.95 Clark argues that “human minds and bodies are essentially open to
episodes of deep and transformative restructuring, in which new equipment (both
physical and ‘mental’) can become quite literally incorporated into the thinking and
acting systems that we identify as minds as persons,”96 and explains that an object as
simple as a hammer is, with regular use, internalized in the mind as an extension of the
arm and a human’s capabilities. Similarly, McLuhan argued all media are extensions of
human senses, and that even basic objects like books are an extension of the eye.97 A
common example of extension among transhumanist literature concerns the artist Stelarc,
who uses sensors placed on his body to transfer signals to a mechanical arm. He describes
that after years of using such a device, he no longer has to consciously think of each
movement, and that he considers the mechanical arm an extension of his own body.98
Similarly, Naam points out a man who suffered a severe stroke, losing all use of his body
from the neck down. With a simple neural implant, he was able to learn to control a
cursor on a computer screen, and after several months of use, claimed he saw the cursor
as an extension of himself, rather than an external object he controlled.99
It’s clear that “progress in computing and information technology has vastly
increased our ability to collect, store, analyze, and communicate information,”100 and that
technology allows us to do things our natural bodies and minds cannot. However, Don
Ihde points out that far too often transhumanists fall into what he calls the Idol of the
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Cyborg—where we wish that an external (or internal) technology would become
completely engrained into us and be completely transparent, but points out that with any
technological enhancement, there is always a compromise. He argues that something a
like prosthetic leg—while having great value at restoring function—is still not a
completely transparent technology. Even a crowned tooth, while highly transparent and
rarely thought about, will at times draw attention, either through being worn down, or
simply the awareness that something in the body is artificial. Ihde claims no technology
will ever be completely internalized, and that transhumanists are too concerned with
merging machines with the human body. More responds, saying that transhumanism is
not concerned with mechanizing the body,101 and while More is correct, I believe Ihde
legitimately points to the perpetual awareness of compromise, one that does not allow
identity to be fully extended to the body’smechanical parts.
Some worry that enhancing intelligence may have a detrimental effect on personal
identity. Agar suggests that “the procedure that enhances your intellect will change the
structure of your brain, leading to uncertainty about whether the person who emerges
from the procedure is you.”102 Bostrom’s response to the loss of personal identity
indicates, as with other transhumanists, that there does not appear to be any logical reason
why enhancing cognitive capacities would result in altering a person’s personality, goals,
skills, memories or otherwise.103 However, Agar continues on to say that extending
intelligence indefinitely, and repeatedly, will stop individuals from having ‘mature
interests.’104 Agar’s concept of ‘mature interests’ is that as humans age, they typically
settle into a more defined set of interests, things they appreciate, when compared to the
more childish tendency to dramatically shift interests over a relatively short time. He
claims that mature interests are crucial to building any meaningful connections between
people, in that without them humans are likely to shift interests more frequently, as with
continued intellectual expansion, and thus never be able to fully explore any one area.
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The result would be people with broad but shallow understandings, and presumably the
elimination of experts from the world. While Agar’s concerns are noted, it seems unlikely
that enhanced cognitive capacities would result in constant boredom.
My primary interest in transhumanist literature is the enhancement of intelligence,
often referred to as cognitive enhancement (CE). Anders Sandberg champions the field of
CE, defining it as “the amplification or extension of core capacities of the mind through
improvement or augmentation of internal or external information processing systems.”105
Compared to other core areas of transhumanism, namely life extension, genetic
engineering, and ability-enhancing drugs, CE is at times seen as more crucial to
developing more tolerant, peaceful, democratic and altogether happier societies.106 Not
only are cognitive enhancements understood as potentially beneficial to positively
influencing existing desirable attributes of society—like our ability to communicate,
understand and apply knowledge, among other things—but they also hold a promise of
addressing existing crises. Buchanan writes, “To solve problems we have created—such
as environmental pollution, overpopulation, and global warming—human beings may
have to enhance cognitive capacities and perhaps their moral capacities as well,”107
which relates back to the body of posthumanist philosophers who believe posthumans
will be in a better position to correct outstanding inequalities and environmental issues
that exist today.108 CE combines the real possibility for enhancing our brains and
intellectual capacities with the philosophical possibility to usher in a posthumanist era.
Others see cognitive enhancement as having already existed, in some sense, for
quite some time. Buchanan contends that “whether cognitive gains are achieved by
learning to read and write or implanting a microchip in the brain is irrelevant; the term
‘enhancement’ is equally applicable.”109 He argues that the introduction of widespread
literacy and numeracy should be considered a profound cognitive enhancement for mass

105

Sandberg, “Cognition Enhancement: Upgrading the Brain.” 71
See Posthuman authors on enhancing our ability to address social and environmental issues, like Siedel
107
Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement. 2
108
Bostrom, “Why I Want to Be a Posthuman When I Grow Up.” 36
109
Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement. 24
106

28

populations.110 Similarly, Clark describes the process where humans create artificial
learning environments, such as methods of education and instruction, which attempt to
give newer generations a greater basis for knowledge and the application of analytical
skills than previous generations. Those people who go on to develop greater methods,
mental techniques and ways of remembering and applying knowledge, create a cycle of
constant cognitive improvement with each new generation.111 It would appear that a great
number of innovations and technologies, both physical and mental, past and present, have
radically extended the natural capacities of the human brain.112
Physical technologies like pen and paper, calculators and information technology
allow humans to access and utilize information beyond the brains natural limits, the result
being what Vernor Vinge referred to as Intelligence Amplification.113 In 1993 Vinge
wrote that “the team of a PhD human and a good computer workstation (even an off-new
workstation) could probably max any written intelligence test in existence,”114 which
suggests that our understanding of intelligence may be limited, or open to change. To
clarify, Kurzweil predicts that in an age where cognitive enhancements are ubiquitous—
especially technological ones that link directly to the brain—that the very nature of
education will change.115 This is to say that when accessing information via the Internet
is so seamlessly integrated into how our brains function, it will become possible to
reevaluate what ‘intelligence’ really is; in an age where every enhanced human has equal
access to massive databases, being able to analyze and utilize that information will be
increasingly important, and memorization will be unproductive.116 Kurzweil predicts that,
much in the fashion of The Matrix, humans will be able to download both knowledge and
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skills directly into nonbiological portions of their brains.117 Sandberg suggests that neural
implants will allow for “offloading irrelevant, repetitive, or boring tasks and enabling a
person to concentrate on more complex challenges that relate in more interesting ways to
her goals,”118 and suggests that may even result in humans having more authentic
interests.
Ramez Naam optimistically notes that cognitive enhancements are likely to have
a multitude of positive effects, as
people with better memories and quicker minds will earn more money and
produce more for others. Any technique that increases the human ability to
learn, to think, or to communicate is going to produce economic returns. It
will increase our ability to solve problems, to make scientific
breakthroughs, and to build better products. Scientists who learn more
quickly will be better able to stay abreast of developments in their field.
Doctors and nurses who can stay alert longer will make fewer errors in
treating patients.119
But there is much debate over what types of cognitive enhancements will be available,
and how they may be used. While my interests lie with neural implants, many discuss
cognitive enhancement via pharmaceuticals; however, many of the proposed effects and
outcomes of using such drugs are at times equally as applicable to implanted devices.
Buchanan states that while brain-computer interfaces, in particular implanted
computers, may very well be possible, he acknowledges that enhancement through drugs
is more likely to occur on a large-scale before brain-implants, due to the lower cost of
production, and less obtrusive methods,120 and the slippery slope between drugs produced
for treatment and restoring function and those used for enhancing capacities.121 Savulescu
and Sandberg indicate that already many drugs designed for treatment are used for
enhancement, and point out that “there is some doubt whether it is even possible to draw
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a consistent and useful distinction between treatment and enhancement.”122 As briefly
discussed earlier, the line between therapy and enhancement, particularly in terms of
drugs, is likely to be increasingly hard to distinguish.
Hughes points out that after the initial rise of cognitive drugs, the next step will be
connecting human brains directly to computers,123 quite possibly through implanting
devices directly into the brain. Nanotechnology specialist J. Storrs Hall writes that
“nanocomputers represent enough power in little enough space that it would make sense
to implant them in your head to extend your sensorium, augment your memory, sharpen
your reasoning.”124 While much transhumanist literature considers the possibilities of
nanocomputers, it is important to note that neurally implanted devices do not necessarily
require being built on an atomic scale; microcomputers are altogether more likely to be
used first, and just as likely to present the same level of cognitive enhancement. That
being said, nanocomputers are much more widely discussed, and contribute a great deal
to the discussion of brain-computer interfaces and neural implants.
Kurzweil, in his ever deterministic way of writing, insists that once we begin to
implant intelligent machines into our brains, our biological intelligence will be dominated
by our artificial intelligence; as our brains are “effectively of fixed capacity,”125 the
computing power of machine intelligence is exponential. Kurzweil argues that intelligent
machines will follow a similar trend to other artificial intelligences, and thus double in
power every year. This might suggest that implanted mechanical artificial intelligence
will overwhelm our original biological brains, a scenario Kurzweil seems unconcerned
with. Ihde points out that this type of scenario—one that involves the fear of machines
replacing humans—is a longstanding myth; technologies have never replaced humans,
even if innovations in machine automation have initially reduced the number of workers
for example, but rather new technologies only change the “nature of the task” by
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tightening the relation between humans and machines.126127 Ihde sees the possibility of
humans being entirely replaced by machines as an impossible outcome, rooted in the
appeal of doomsday-type fiction.128 Andy Clark, Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the
University of Edinburgh, anticipates that when neural implants or brain-computer
interfaces become intelligent, “when our technologies actively, automatically, and
continually tailor themselves to us just as we do to them—then the line between tool and
user becomes flimsy indeed.”129
Hughes predicts that neural implants will profoundly augment human lives,
writing that “we will have unimaginable access to and control over our currently
unconscious reactions to the world, our ingrained defense to hierarchy, our addictions and
self-destructive behaviors, and the ways we are manipulated by advertising, charismatic
authority and social approval.”130 While much of what Hughes foresees may be in the
more distant future, the development of connecting the brain directly to devices is
relatively new; arguably science has really only begun to understand how the brain works
since the beginning of the 21st century,131 and already a great deal of work has been
accomplished.132 “While we are still far from understanding higher-level thinking, we are
beginning to figure out how the individual components work and how they are hooked
up,”133 which, for someone like Kurzweil, is the first step in reverse-engineering the
brain. If we can understand how the different parts of the brain process information, store

126

Ihde, “Of Which Human Are We Post?”133
Harry Braverman, for one, disagrees, as he argues that automation and new technologies have
historically not only decreased the number of workers necessary for production, but at times completely
remove human labour. See Harry Braverman, “The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century,”
Monthly Review 41, no. 5 (October 1989) for more, as this issue is far too big for this thesis to address
adequately.
128
Max More quoted in Hughes, Citizen Cyborg. - argues that end-of-the-world concepts appeal to Western
cultures
129
Clark, Natural-born Cyborgs. 7
130
Hughes, Citizen Cyborg. 200
131
Nick Bostrom, “Welcome to a World of Exponential Change,” in Better Humans? The Politics of
Human Enhancement and Life Extension, ed. Paul Miller and James Wilsdon (London: Demos, 2006), 43
132
See Chapter 2 of this thesis for accounts of current implanted technologies
133
Bostrom, “Welcome to a World of Exponential Change.” 46
127

32

and access memory, we—in theory—can build artificial intelligence based on our own
brains.134
Predicting how—not to mention when—neural implants will significantly
augment human brains concerns a wide range of authors. In 2003, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) published a series of papers concerning the future merging of
nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science (NBIC),
giving legitimacy to the growing body of transhumanist and futurist literature. The NSF
reports stated that in the near future, new technologies would be routinely implanted
directly into the human brain, likely used to access the World Wide Web, and
communicate directly with other implanted humans. Such technologies were predicted to
be widely available by 2030.135 The NSF’s report concluded “With proper attention to
ethical and societal needs, converging technologies could achieve tremendous
improvement in human abilities, societal outcomes, the nation’s productivity, and the
quality of life.”136
Transhumanist Alex Chislenko predicts neural communication implants are likely
to contribute to breaking down global barriers by augmenting language; intelligent
translators will ease communication between people using different languages, and neural
implants will make such connections effortless.137 Having humans more easily
communicate and access information suggests a synergistic effect that Eric Drexler refers
to as ‘collective intelligence,’ where the more people are able to connect through
technology, the more powerful the knowledge-base becomes.138 Ben Goertzel and
Stephan Bugaj, combining the idea of collective intelligence with the possibility for
artificial intelligence, suggests that a ‘global brain’ may emerge, a system that
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encompasses all artificial and human intelligence, with practically limitless
capabilities.139
Don Ihde warns against relying too heavily on prediction, what he refers to as
worshipping the Idol of Prediction.140 He argues futurists too readily believe in
prediction, and that they are likely to slip from thinking something might happen to the
conviction that it will happen. Ihde makes reference to David Nye, who in 2006 discussed
a list of over 1,500 predictions made by science fiction writers, futurists and scientists
between 1890 and 1940, of which less than one-third came to fruition.141 In response,
Max More points out that many predictions made in the past few decades, especially
those by Kurzweil and Moravec, two authors Ihde is most concerned with refuting, have
indeed come true.142,143 One account for the failure for earlier predictions to come true is
that as technology has advanced, our ability to analyze trends has become increasingly
accurate. As such, forecasting future technologies has become increasingly important for
businesses, many of which rely on Moore’s Law when developing timelines for new
products.
As our ability to predict became more precise, speculative science fiction also
changed. Vinge notes that while early science fiction used to envision intelligent
machines existing hundreds if not thousands of years in the future, contemporary science
fiction sees these outcomes as happening before the 22nd century.144 This is partly due to
an increased interest in the possibility of a technological singularity, a time when the
exponential growth of technology—and of intelligent machines—becomes so rapid it
becomes nearly impossible to assume what would happen next. At the point where
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machine intelligence is greater than our own, it is possible that artificial minds may be
better at imagining and creating new technologies, and thus our unenhanced human
minds would be unable to perceive where technology might lead. What’s important about
this shift in science fiction is that, for N. Katherine Hayles, science fiction is critical to
transhumanism, in that much of transhumanist discussion decontextualizes what is really
at stake in favor of broad, generalized philosophies and social policies. For Hayles,
science fiction recontextualizes transhumanism with detailed depictions of society and
technology in the future, and allows for a more comprehensive debate over the possible
outcomes emerging technologies may contribute to.145 Furthermore, transhumanists such
as Bostrom have been accused of focalism—too much attention paid to the possible ways
enhancement technologies might be beneficial at the present, an optimism that extends
into his predictions for the future, causing him to overlook the way problems may also
develop alongside the benefits.146 For this reason, forecasting via science fiction—which
often explores dystopic, negative, or at least ambiguous visions of the future—is central
to transhumanism.147
Kurzweil, one of the most prominent of the current technological futurists, and
certainly one of the most vocal, predicts that by 2019 neural implants will be relatively
common,148 and that, just as Bostrom predicts, by 2020 we can reasonably assume that
hardware will be as fast and powerful as the human brain in its computational
capacities149; the problem of developing software that is capable of the complex
analytical skills of the human brain is an altogether different one.150 Kurzweil sees the
trend of neural implants continuing, and that by 2030 there will be networks of intelligent
nanobots that communicate directly with our brains, allowing us to access memories,
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communicate, and access information151; by 2099, neural implants will be so powerful
and ubiquitous in everyday life, that unenhanced humans will be unable to communicate
on any meaningful level with the rest of the enhanced population.152

1.5

Exponential Change & The Singularity

Many transhumanist authors find addressing the Singularity, regardless of their support of
ii, as necessary, especially when attempting to predict future technologies and their
impacts.153 Vernor Vinge writes that a technological singularity is likely to occur by rapid
technological growth leading to the emergence of true AI,154 via biological changes that
radically increase our own intellect, or “computer/human interfaces may become so
intimate that users may reasonably be considered superhumanly intelligent.”155
While Vinge may have been the first to suggest a technological singularity,156 it
has been Ray Kurzweil who has so adamantly warned of its importance and inevitability.
Kurzweil focuses on the Singularity that “will allow us to overcome age-old human
problems and vastly amplify human creativity. We will preserve and enhance the
intelligence that evolution has bestowed on us while overcoming the profound limitations
of biological evolution,” before carefully noting that “the Singularity will also amplify
the ability to act on our destructive inclinations, so its full story has not yet been
written.”157 Basing his vision of the Singularity on computing trends of the past,
Kurzweil sees an exponential growth in the power and speed of computers. For some, this
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implies that technology will begin to advance so quickly that humans will be unable to
adapt to innovations before even newer ones have arrived—that is, unless we enhance our
own cognitive capacities to keep up.158 The concern that humans will be unable to adapt
quickly enough to new technology is however a longstanding fear, stemming back to
Alvin and Heidi Toffler’s 1970 book Future Shock, in which they proposed that as
technology exponentially increased, more and more people would suffer from “shattering
stress and disorientation that we induce on individuals by subjecting them to too much
change in too short a time,”159 a prediction that Hughes notes has since failed to have as
dramatic an impact as once thought.
Despite Kurzweil’s insistence that the Singularity is inevitable,160other futurists
are less convinced. While Vinge once saw the Singularity as unavoidable,161 he has since
amended himself, arguing it is likely but not guaranteed.162 Extropians, who lean towards
the more libertarian and deterministic side of transhumanism, argue that individuals must
actively pursue enhancements in order to prosper through the Singularity;163but even
among extropians there is doubt that a Singularity may ever occur.164 Instead, trends in
computing, while exponential, show that new technologies routinely follow an ‘s’
curve—where they have slow starts, followed by rapid and exponential growth, before
slowing down as they become more widespread—a trend many technological innovations
have followed for some time.165 Some see that while technology grows faster and more
powerful, these growths occur at different rates among different industries and fields of
development, where despite Moore’s Law, other aspects in technological growth move at
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much slower rates.166 Grassie argues that there are six key aspects holding back a
Singularity from occurring, including the fallacy of exponential growth, meaning that
most examples of exponential growth in other areas throughout history have either
slowed or reached a point of implosion.167 Grassie also notes that there are basic physical
limits to computing, a point Hall drives home when he describes current nanotech
simulations show that even basic nanobots have extremely high heat outputs, with some
being theoretically equivalent to a small explosion.168,169
Although Vinge argues a technological Singularity is likely, he suggests that it is
ultimately determined by the work of humans,170 and thus, the rate that humans produce
technological precursors to the Singularity may be controlled. Bostrom points out that
there is often a time gap between conceiving a new technology and its actual production,
which may remain relatively constant, impeding the rate that new technologies can
occur171; Sandberg notes that economic factors like high costs of production may hinder
exponential growth, as well as the fact that requiring increasingly specialized skills and
knowledge to develop various technologies will reduce the number of people working on
technological development.172 Computer scientists suspect that artificial intelligence—
not to mention enhanced humans capable of faster discoveries and higher productivity—
may rapidly increase the speed of production.173 In fact, Hughes, in agreement with
Vinge, states that humans need to begin enhancing and augmenting their intelligence in
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order to stay one step ahead of the machines,174 suggesting that while Kurzweil may be
correct in predicting machine intelligence will surpass human intelligence in 2045, it is
likely human intelligence will in one way or another have been enhanced beyond our
current state.
Going back to the miscommunication between authors in the human enhancement
debate, Kurzweil—without ever mentioning transhumanism—describes Max More’s
belief in the Singularity concept; More however, views the Singularity as “a classic
religious, Christian-style, end-of-the-world concept that appeals to people in Western
cultures deeply. It’s also mostly nonsense…The Singularity concept has all the earmarks
of an idea that can lead to cultishness, and passivity,” before perceptively noting that,
“There’s a tremendous amount of hard work to be done, and intellectual masturbation
about a supposed Singularity is not going to get us anywhere.”175 Moreover, Goertzel and
Bugaj write, “it is worth noting, however, that most aspects of posthumanity do not
necessarily require a Singularity as described, requiring only a linear, still transformative,
rate of change.”176

1.6

Posthuman Society

As cognitive enhancements become more and more a reality, the burning questions in the
minds of many transhumanists are Who will have access to enhancements? How will
cognitive enhancement research and development be funded? and How much might
commercially available cognitive enhancements cost? Transhumanism, while largely
made up of academic work, is after all part of an emerging industry, and as such,
transhumanist research into future technologies receive substantial funding from the
National Science Foundation.177 While there are activists such as Jeremy Rifkin, whose
work is geared towards uniting religious conservatives with anti-technology liberals by
asserting emerging enhancements will “only serve the nefarious ends of their corporate
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manufacturers,”178 it is also true that many transhumanist authors are employed in
helping produce actual enhancement technologies.179 Whether enhancements will be part
of a corporate consumer culture is primarily determined by social and political policies.
At present, it is clear not everyone is in support of cognitive enhancements,180 but
as they become increasingly available, either through pharmaceuticals or implanted
devices, “it is possible that social support for people who refuse to take advantage of
enhancements will diminish.”181 But this would require CE to firstly become available to
a large portion of the population. One of the most important issues in making
enhancements widely available is “to consider whether future cognitive enhancement
would be expensive (like good schools) or cheap (like caffeine).”182As with any product,
after initial development costs, an economy of scale emerges, making the possibility for
widespread use greater; current cognitive enhancements, like drugs, while having large
startup costs, are relatively cheap to manufacture.183 Many see that the possibility for
rapidly decreasing costs for enhancements. When coupled with large societal demand for
enhancements, and careful policy enactments that enable affordable enhancing, the richpoor divide in access to enhancements could be virtually erased.184,185
One thing to consider when evaluating the economic benefit of cognitive
enhancements is in considering network effects. Firstly, Savulescu and Sandberg note
that forgetfulness and its network effects cost hundreds of millions a year—in Britain
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alone.186 They contend that widespread cognitive enhancements—particularly ones that
enhance memory and recollection—will result in a substantial reduction of losses—
including deaths resulting from carelessness, or medical errors. Secondly, while some
believe that enhanced humans will gain a competitive advantage over unenhanced
humans, one that will force a new social divide, Buchanan notes that the opposite might
be true; some cognitive enhancements will not only have networked effects for others
who are not enhanced, such as greater policies and ways of approaching inequality, but
that it is wrong to think of enhancements as a zero-sum situation.187 Instead, it’s plausible
that cognitive enhancements will actually benefit both individuals and groups as more
people become enhanced, as it will allow greater collaboration. Furthermore, studies
indicate that higher intelligence levels often correlate with higher wages, less debt, and
contribute more to their country’s economy,188 indicating that a society that openly
embraces and actively pursues making cognitive enhancement affordable and widely
available will most likely see an increase in productivity and economic gains. Such a
society would thus be at a better vantage point to provide care for those in need.189
Despite the growing disparity between rich and poor, access to technology—and
the benefits and negatives it allows—is increasingly common: “in real terms, the poor of
the world are closing the gap with the rich—in life expectancy, in education, in access to
technology.”190 For example, in the mid-1990s there was major concern regarding the
digital divide—who had access to computers and the Internet and who did not—which
has since reduced dramatically due to rapidly falling prices for basic technologies.191
However, other parts of the world have remained steady in their lack of access to
technology, partly because of weak public institutions, poor education, economics and
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infrastructure to support newer technologies.192 This would indicate that with emerging
enhancements, it is crucial that federal policies be put in place to ensure the greatest
access to cognitive enhancements.193,194

1.7

Public Policy & Regulation

At this point in the human enhancement debate, Buchanan insists that “what is needed is
policy proposals for coping with the challenges of enhancement that are definite enough
to be of some practical use, not an endless iteration of the pros and cons of
enhancement.”195At present, academic research regarding cognitive enhancement is
predominantly restricted to recognized medical pathologies, meaning funding is only
allocated if researchers can prove their work is primarily used for therapeutic and
restorative uses. The result is “researchers find it difficult—even impossible—to secure
funding to study potential cognitive enhancers,”196 which causes several bad outcomes.
First, it forces researchers to look to what is one of the greatest sources of funding for
enhancement: military contracts. While military funding contributes a great deal
financially, it forces enhancement projects to keep military interests first and foremost,
and pushes enhancement out of the realm of transhumanism and into something
potentially used for warfare, something transhumanists generally disapprove of.197 For
over ten years the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has
investigated brain-computer interfaces that will allow soldiers to communicate directly to
one another, and to control devices by thought.198
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Secondly, societies that refuse to acknowledge that therapeutic technologies will
undoubtedly be used for enhancement, which is already occurring, will be unable to
effectively regulate or establish safety guidelines.199 As the line between therapy and
enhancement quickly blurs, the result is twofold: cognitive enhancements that piggy-back
on innovations geared towards treatment are likely to receive more funding than if they
were strictly proposed as enhancements, while reducing or even eliminating the
“opportunity for democratic, scientifically informed decisions about its comparative
worth.”200 Central to transhumanism are democratic decisions on how enhancements are
used and regulated: such choices are only possible by informing the public of the
complexity of the issues. Any society that allows enhancements to become widespread
either by abusing therapy technologies, black market enhancement, or forcing citizens to
seek enhancement operations in other countries will be unable to control enhancement
use, and are more susceptible to a plethora of negative outcomes.201
Just as Buchanan insists human enhancement discussions must become part of a
larger body of politics and society-wide information campaigns, Hughes, Miller and
Wilsdon also believe that the debate must be moved outside of the confines of the
transhumanist sphere.202 As technological advances may become exponentially faster, it
is crucial that cognitive enhancement be acknowledged by policy makers and
governments on a global scale, with Buchanan suggesting a global institute be formed in
order to promote global justice and equality that is specific to dealing with enhancement
issues.203 It is important to note that “when transhumanists refer to ‘technology’ as a
primary means of effecting changes to the human condition, this should be understood
broadly to include the design of organizations, economies, polities, and the use of
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psychological methods and tools.”204 Transhumanists insist that new policies must go
hand-in-hand with technological innovation.
The Action Group of Erosion Technology and Concentration (ETC) argues that
society should follow a ‘precautionary principle,’ which states “no technology should be
used until its risks are full assessed.”205 While transhumanists strongly believe in risk
assessment prior to allowing any enhancement to be used or commercialized, Hughes
points out “What exactly are all the risks of any technology fully assessed, and what do
you do in the meantime?”206 The obvious problem here is that emerging technologies
such as cognitive enhancements may rapidly become available—legally or otherwise—
and push towards a rushed political debate concerning their use, if not skipping political
debate altogether.
Fukuyama, among most anti-enhancement critics, argues that there needs to be a
clear line between technologies for therapy, and technologies for enhancement. He
writes, “The original purpose of medicine is, after all, to heal the sick, not to turn healthy
people into gods.”207 Agar contends we have two options: to make radical enhancements
mandatory for all citizens, or enact a complete ban (which he is much more in favor
of).208 However, banning cognitive enhancements is an incredibly complex issue, as even
Fukuyama notes that a ban in one country will only push development into another area
of the world.209 Countries that ban cognitive enhancement research and technologies will
also force their citizens to seek enhancement elsewhere, causing only the wealthiest to
have access. Naam expands on the complexity of a complete ban, “A ban would make
enhancement procedures more expensive by creating a black market with an artificially
high price, further separating the rich and poor. It would add risk for those who sought
enhancement, by removing any possibility of safety regulations. Furthermore, a ban
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would hinder scientific progress, as long-term studies on the effects of these technologies
would be impossible.”210 Both transhumanists and anti-enhancement advocates see a
complete ban as unlikely.
Nicolas Agar proposes that only moderate enhancements be permissible, which
would include any enhancement that allows all humans to achieve higher capacities that
other humans have already achieved, such as genetically engineering all children to be as
smart as Einstein and as good at tennis as Roger Federer.211 Agar’s argument however
comes apart when we consider that if future generations are enhanced enough so that
each and every person is say, as intelligent as Einstein, then it is likely they will soon
make discoveries beyond what Einstein was capable of, and in doing so, will push the
boundaries of what humans have already achieved. Enhanced humans would see it
permissible to enhance subsequent generation to their new current capacities, and over
time continually push that boundary further and further.
Sandberg suggests that enhancements should be widely available, as individuals
should have the right to modify their own bodies.212 He sees that previous methods of
body modification and control—through tattooing, abortion, birth control, among
others—have liberated individuals from state control and allowed for better expression of
personal identity and needs.213 At the same time, Sandberg, along with Savulescu,
believes that initial enhancements should be made available on a need-basis, in order to
ensure social classes do not dramatically separate.214 There is considerable concern that
enhancements—particularly cognitive enhancements—will exacerbate social inequality,
and rightfully so. James Hughes advocates for a particular strain of transhumanism called
democratic transhumanism, where establishing social structures and policies that protect
individual rights and ensuring universal access are crucial to society and the world at
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large in the coming years.215 Caplan points out that the core issue is not that our minds
and bodies may become enhanced, augmented, or even be recognized as a new species,
but rather that there are social and political structures that perpetuate inequalities between
races, genders and economic classes.216 Emerging technologies cannot be used to the
benefit of society if such strong inequalities are allowed to exist. Transhumanists believe
education, public debate, and political change are necessary—and soon—before
enhancements have the opportunity to worsen existing issues.217
However, before any real policy or regulations can be effectively drafted and
enacted, there needs to be serious ethical deliberation. Human enhancement technologies
are radically different from each other, both in the way they are used, as well as how they
are developed. The debate thus far has considered cognitive enhancement to be a single
category of human enhancement, often focusing entirely on genetic engineering and
pharmaceuticals. The problem is that various types of cognitive enhancements raise
different ethical considerations, and consequently lead to different forms of policy and
regulation. So far I’ve shown that those involved in the debate over cognitive
enhancement argue from a multitude of viewpoints, challenging the political, economic
and social implications of these emerging technologies. For the most part they deal with
how these technologies will be developed; how they will be distributed amongst members
of society; and how those enhanced humans will interact with each other as well as
unenhanced citizens—all of these arguments, whether stated explicitly or not, deal with
ethical principle. Many touch on how these technologies can be used to avoid worsening
existing inequalities, particularly those between economic classes, which is
fundamentally an issue of distributive justice. Others focus on how these technologies
may be used to create the greatest outcome for as many people as possible, which is
clearly utilitarian. Lastly, some argue human enhancement violates the natural world and
the natural order of things, threatens human nature and human dignity—these are all
deontological positions. As I’ve shown, major positions focus on any number of
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philosophical, sociological, economical, statistical or political issues at hand, with the
overall direction of the debate moving towards bringing these disciplines together in
order to inform policy and to help shape and regulate emerging HETs. However, at this
point, the debate requires some narrowing, as it is difficult—if not impossible—to
attempt to regulate such broad technologies as genetic engineering, artificial limbs and
organs, and brain-computer interfaces as if they were all the same. Each technology
requires its own evaluation and discussion. Therefore, before I can explore the ethical
questions and considerations of cognitive enhancement through BCIs, I have to illustrate
what specific technologies exist today, how they are used, how they are developed, and
the types of BCIs in development for use in the near future.
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2

Brain Computer Interfacing
You know in the year 2000 we’ll all be on speed dial. You’ll just have to
think of a person, and they’ll be talking to you. It’ll be like whoa, getting a
call here.
—Cosmo Kramer. Seinfeld

2.1

Introduction

Transhumanists use the term ‘cognitive enhancement’ as a way of generally referring to a
variety of technologies used to enhance brain function—from pharmaceuticals that
increase focus to futuristic intelligent brain implants. This thesis is particularly interested
in technologies that facilitate interaction between the brain and electronic devices, a field
broadly known as brain-computer interfacing. These technologies are blanketed by the
more general term ‘neuroprosthetics,’ which refers to any technology that interacts with
the nervous system, such as cochlear or retinal implants. These devices can help facilitate
communication by receiving external stimulation and relaying it to the brain, but braincomputer interfaces (BCIs) specifically offer non-muscular communication output that
the user can control.218 The term BCI encompasses both surgically implanted devices, as
well as non-invasive technologies that record brain activity.
BCIs are currently one of the most significant areas of research that are considered
part of cognitive enhancement, as they offer not only an alternative to traditional
communication methods, but they also suggest the possibility of enhancing it; allowing
humans to speed up communication,219 extend communication beyond the body’s
physical limitations,220 and seamlessly merge information systems with the human mind.
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Furthermore, experiments in BCI research continually add to the growing body of
knowledge as to how the brain functions, both in terms of its individual parts as well as
the system as a whole.

2.2

History of BCIs

The first experiments with recording human brain function—and the beginning of braincomputer interfacing—began in 1924, when Hans Berger, a German scientist, recorded
electrical brain activity through the human scalp.221 His method involved placing
electrode receivers on the scalp, a technology called electroencephalography (EEG),
which is widely used today. Unfortunately, not only was the technology of the time far
too crude to accurately measure the signals, but the understanding of the brain’s functions
and particularly electrical signals produced by the brain was in its infancy. Because
neuroscience had barely scratched the surface of understanding how different parts of the
brain functioned and interacted with each other, initial research into rudimentary braincomputer interfacing was slow and limited.
In the 1950s, Jose Delgado, a physiologist at Yale University, began implanting
electrodes into the brains of live animals in an effort to understand brain function. His
work, published in Physical Control of the Mind in 1969, described the process of
stimulating electrodes within the brain using a type of radio receiver called a stimoceiver,
and recording the types of electrical outputs during various exercises with the animals.
Delgado had studied the electrical output in the brain of a bull during aggression,
discovering which section was responsible for the behaviour. One of his most prolific
experiments involved Delgado himself using a red sheet to taunt the bull—already
implanted with an electrode in the brain and stimoceiver in the skull. The bull rushed
Delgado, who activated a transmitter device that activated the stimoceiver to send an
electrical pulse to the part of the brain most active during aggression. In response, the
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bull halted immediately, and retreated.222 Delgado’s work extended to implanting similar
devices in primates in order to understand brain activity, where “he found that he could
electronically control sleep, appetite, sexual arousal, aggression, and even social
behavior.”223 Delgado’s work greatly contributed to understanding how parts of the brain
functioned and interacted, and lead to what is now known as Deep Brain Stimulation
(DBS), which implants devices into the brains of patients with a variety mental illnesses
in order to electrically stimulate damaged areas. Although even current DBS systems
only allow input into the brain and not output to external devices, this type of technology
indicates that implantable devices can be used to alter human behaviour in a variety of
ways, which is a form of cognitive enhancement.
The first functioning BCI implant came about in 1964 when Dr. Grey Walter
implanted a small electrode to the motor areas of a voluntary patient’s brain during an
unrelated surgery.224 Afterwards, Walter gave the patient control of a slideshow, where
whenever the patient wished to move the slide forward, he would press a button, and
Walter would record changes in his brain activity. Walter identified a specific electrical
signal that was produced anytime the patient advanced the slide, so he deactivated the
patient’s button, and instead hooked up the slideshow to advance whenever the patient
thought about pressing the button. However, Walter found that the BCI system was faster
than the patient—the BCI registered the patient’s thought faster than the body, and so the
slide would move before the patient actually pressed the button. This resulted in a jarring
effect on the patient, as the slide would move just slightly before they pressed the button
each time, so Walter had to delay the reaction of the BCI to meet the patient’s expected
reaction time to when the slide should advance.
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The term BCI was coined by Jacques J. Vidal, a professor at UCLA’s Brain
Computer Interface lab, who in 1976 produced a functioning BCI for basic
communication. The device he and his team built allowed a user to control a cursor
through a two-dimensional maze,225 indicating that brain activity could be processed to
allow people to control external objects and software. The 1970s also saw advances in
BCI research to augment both sight and hearing. The first camera-brain interface was an
electrode implanted into a blind patient’s visual cortex, and allowed them to ‘see’ flashes
of light.226 In 1979, the first auditory brainstem implant was used, which allowed patients
with cochlear damage to bypass the ear entirely, and receive audio from a device partially
implanted on the side of their head.227 However, these early predecessors to the cochlear
implant used widely today228 had very poor speech perception, but did allow patients to
more easily read lips.
BCI research increased dramatically in the mid-1980s, as advances in science—
particularly understanding of brain functions—alongside the development of faster, more
powerful, and cheaper computers have driven the merging of computer science with
medicine in order to meet the needs of people with disabilities.229 BCI research centered
around working with patients with advanced forms of neuromuscular disorders like
amyotrophic later sclerosis (ALS, or Lou Gehrig’s Disease), who in later stages of the
disease become ‘locked-in,’ meaning they are unable to communicate or move in any
way. The goal of much of the research at the turn of the century—and continuing on
today—was concerned with restoring communication functions to improve quality of life.
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In 1999, “Birbaumer and colleagues reported the first two locked-in patients using a BCI
to communicate messages,”230 which allowed them to use an EEG-based BCI to slowly
select letters from an array. One of these two patients was able to use the BCI without
assistance, and began to write letters to friends and family.
At the University of Berkeley, researchers working on camera-brain interfaces
implanted a small chip into a cat’s thalamus, which is the area of the brain the processes
visual signals.231 In 1999, they recorded electrical output from the electrode in short
bursts, which they used to reconstruct low quality images of what the cat saw. Due to the
physical limits of the implant—mainly the low number of electrodes and datatransfer
rate—the images were very small, but are “recognizable versions of the scenes played out
before the cat’s eyes.”232
In 1999, the First International Meeting of Brain Computer Interfacing took place in
New York, bringing together a wide range of experts from a diverse group of disciplines,
including neuroscience, biology, computer science and business.233 At this time, “there
were only one or two dozen labs doing serious BCI research. However, BCI research
developed quickly after that…There are at least 100 BCI research groups active today
[2010], and this number is growing.”234 Due to the ease of designing and testing BCIs
that do not require a surgical procedure, a large portion of BCI research focuses on noninvasive systems.
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2.3

Non-invasive BCIs

There are generally two broad categories of brain computer interfaces: non-invasive
(technologies that typically record brain activity through sensors placed on the scalp) and
invasive (technologies that are surgically implanted). At present, surgically implanted
BCIs are not only generally more expensive, but also carry far greater risks to the
patient’s health. A significant portion of current BCI research concerns non-invasive
technologies, which in many ways provide the building blocks for future implants; by
experimenting with recording various types of brain activity, the collective body of
knowledge as to how various parts of the brain interact with each other grows,235 which
in turn nurtures research into the development of devices that replace or supplement
specific capabilities of the brain (memory, reasoning, empathy, etc.).
There are three leading types of non-invasive neuroimaging technologies used in
current BCI research: electroencephalography (EEG), which records electrical charges
that take place during brain activity and is the most widely used;
magnetoencephalography (MEG), which examines magnetic fields created from the
electrical output of the brain; and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which
measures small changes in blood oxygenation that occur during brain activity.236
However, both MEG and fMRI are more expensive than EEG, which is relatively cheap
in comparison.237 MEG requires a magnetically shielded room to prevent external
magnetic waves—however minute—from interfering with the machine, making MEG
both expensive to build, as well as impractical for mobile applications. Similarly, fMRI
machines are large and cumbersome, making them poor candidates for popularizing
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BCIs. EEG technologies, however, are easily portable and lightweight,238 and are “the
most practical modality—if we want to bring BCI technology to a large population.”239
EEG-powered BCIs generally have the same setup: a cap that consists of
electrode sensors that is placed on the patient’s scalp, usually with a layer of conductive
gel in between. The cap is connected to an amplifier, which then connects to a computer.
The basic hardware setup plus a wide variety of software applications make the device
flexible and open to further development. A two-day BCI workshop called Brainihack
was held at Google’s Tel Aviv campus in November 2013, where teams of developers,
neuroscientists and artists competed to rapidly develop BCI software using standard
EEG-cap type hardware.
The most basic BCI software system is the P300, which works by presenting the
user with an array of options (such as letters or numbers) which randomly flash on
screen. As the user focuses on the object they wish to select, the BCI hardware registers
spikes in brain activity that occur when the user sees their object highlighted. As a result,
the BCI software records these spikes and aligns them with what object was highlighted
at the moment of heightened brain activity. While the P300 can be slow to use for
communication purposes, users typically adjust to the device within just a few
minutes.240
The majority of EEG-based BCIs to date have been used for medical purposes,
specifically to restore lost communicative capacities due to spinal cord or brain injury, or
degenerative disease. Among the most common causes for lost communication are
abilities “Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), brainstem stroke, brain or spinal cord
injury, cerebral palsy, muscular dystrophies, and multiple sclerosis,” which in 2002
collectively “affected nearly two million people in the Unite Stated alone, and far more
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around the world.”241 Patients with ALS are among the most common users of BCIs, as it
is a neurodegenerative disease that progressively paralyzes muscle groups throughout the
body, but most often leaves mental function intact.242 As the disease progresses, patients
eventually become referred to as ‘locked-in,’ as they lose all ability to control and move
their body, but the brain remains active. ALS patients most commonly use P300-based
BCI systems: they choose one letter at a time from a grid displayed on a computer screen.
One of the most troubling aspects of ALS is that as patients get progressively
worse, many consider their quality of life to be very low, since they are increasingly
unable to interact with the outside world, and find expressing themselves extremely
difficult.243 As a result, some ALS patients refuse to receive artificial nutrition and
ventilation to keep themselves alive. Current BCI technologies not only provide an
opportunity to restore a basic level of communication, but the rapid speed of
technological advancement and expanding interest in BCI technologies in general—not to
mention increasing grants and budget allocations from a variety of institutions going to
BCI research—indicate that future BCIs will provide better, more affordable, and more
mobile systems that may even fully restore communication for ALS patients.
German pharmacist Ursula Broerman developed ALS in 2003, rendering her
unable to work. Broerman began receiving artificial ventilation and nutrition in order to
stay alive. She is almost entirely unable to move, yet using an EEG-based BCI, continues
to communicate with her family and friends; she even published academic work, writing
about her experience using a BCI. When asked why she chose to be artificially respirated,
and communicate using a painstakingly-slow BCI, she replied, “Life is always beautiful,
exciting and valuable.”244
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EEG-based BCIs have also been used in a variety of non-medical applications.
Using a P300-based software, Bayliss and Ballard had users control appliances in a 3D
virtual smart home. Flashing spheres would appear randomly over various devices in the
simulation (a TV or a light for example), and the user would focus on the appliance they
wanted to turn on or off. The system recorded at which points electrical output from brain
activity was strongest in order to analyze which virtual appliance the user was focusing
on. In 2012, a group the University of Twente in The Netherlands developed simple a
video game called Mind The Sheep!, which presented the player with a top-down
perspective of a field with ten sheep and three dogs. The user would focus on which dog
they wanted to move while simultaneously using a mouse to select where they wanted
that dog to move. When the mouse button was released, the system would analyze which
dog they were focusing on, and move it to the location they selected, with the goal of
herding the sheep into a pen. These game-type BCIs, despite having incredibly simple
and even mundane gameplay, indicate that BCI research has extended beyond restoring
human functions, and has begun enhancing them. BCIs let healthy users control external
activities and keep their hands free to complete other complex tasks.
Despite the prevalence of EEG technology in BCI research and development,
there are currently significant technological limitations. EEG sensors on the scalp are
susceptible to forms of bioelectrical activity created by body movements, where even
electrical output from eye movements or blinks cannot be distinguished from electrical
activity in the brain, causing the output data to be easily skewed.245 The frequency range
is also very narrow, meaning that the types of activities possible with EEG-based BCIs
are limited; moving a cursor on a 1-dimensional plane is exponentially easier than in a
3D space due to the limited number of different thought patterns that are discernable
through EEG. EEG-based BCIs have traditionally suffered from very low information
transfer rates,246 which limits the complexity of BCI software and possible applications.
In 2002, Wolpaw et al. commented that, “many possible applications of BCI technology,
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such as neuroprosthesis control, may require higher information transfer rates,”247—at the
time, BCI-controlled prosthetic limbs had yet to be used with any success. Since then,
several prominent cases of BCI-controlled prosthetics have garnered significant acclaim.
However, these devices and software applications suffer from low accuracy rates, with
70% accuracy being considered acceptable, “which is rather low compared to traditional
input technologies.”248 This means that users typically struggle to control prosthetics and
external devices using EEG technologies, in comparison to implanted BCIs, which have
had much greater accuracy and ease of use.249
Despite EEG signals that are “very weak, noisy and non-stationary, there is an entire
research area in signal processing and classification aiming to derive a stable control
signal from the complex brain activity that enables reliable BCI control,”250creating
increasingly inexpensive, commonplace EEG-based BCIs. In 2009, Mattel commercially
released an EEG-based BCI toy called Mindflex, which had users control a ball through
an obstacle course.251 Users pressed buttons on the machine to guide the ball around,
while the BCI allowed them to raise or lower it. Despite EEG-based BCIs becoming
more commonplace, they are still limited in the complexity of the tasks they can enable.
Current EEG-based BCIs are incapable of performing “complex tasks like rapid online
chatting, grasping a bottle with a robotic arm, or playing some computer games,”252
compared to implanted devices, which are far more precise.

2.4

Implanted BCIs

Implanted BCIs typically consist of an array of electrodes surgically implanted under the
skull, on top of the cortex. EEG-type BCIs consist of electrodes placed on the scalp, and
are difficult to place at the exact same positions each time they are applied, which make it
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“difficult to record from the same neurons every time or to leave the electrode in place
for more than a few months at a time.”253 Implanted electrodes on the other hand are
fixed in place, some of which are “impregnated with neurotrophic factors, which
encourage neurons to grow into and around the electrode, anchoring it in place and
allowing it to [transmit] for a much longer time.”254 Because of their greater stability and
closer proximity to the brain itself, implanted BCIs offer “excellent signal quality, very
good spatial resolutions, and a higher frequency range,”255 which allows for greater
accuracy in BCI usage, and more complex applications.256
It should be noted that transhumanists, among others, often classify implanted
computers and BCI-type devices within the realm of nanocomputing. Nanocomputing
refers to a growing field of research that aims to make devices on an atomic scale, by
precisely assembling objects using single atoms as building blocks. Contemporary BCI
implants—as well as the types of complex BCIs many groups aspire to make—do not
necessarily need to be made on a nano-scale. Microcomputing, which is not only less
costly but far easier to design and build, is far more likely to become commonplace
among implantable BCIs before nanocomputing. Implantable BCI research is, for the
most part, developing independently of nanocomputing.

2.4.1

BrainGate

Apart from the high costs and intrusiveness of implanting devices into the brain, not to
mention the risks of meddling with the brain’s natural functioning, there are also
concerns about the long-term effects of leaving a device inside the brain. There appears
to be some inconsistancies within the BCI community, as in 2010 leading BCI research
team lead by Bernhard Graimann wrote, “It is unclear whether both ECoG and
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intracortial recordings can provide safe and stable recordings over years.”257 While it is
true that many brain implants to date “have eventually failed because of moisture or other
perils of the internal environment,”258 a device called BrainGate has had great success,
and drawn much attention.259 BrainGate, a combination system of software and hardware
that can “directly sense electrical signals produced by neurons in the brain that control
movement,”260 seems to have proven implantable devices can safely be left underneath
the skull. In November 2013 the BrainGate team announced one of their patients had
used the same implant for over 1,000 days without any sign of harm or impairment.261
BrainGate was launched in 2002 under the supervision of Dr. John Donoghue and Dr.
Arto Nurmikko from Brown University, in conjunction with bio-tech company
Cyberkinetics,262 and later joined by researchers from Stanford University, where its
development and testing took place at Providence VA Medical Center and Massachusetts
General Hospital. In 2005, the first BrainGate device was implanted in Matt Nagle, a
tetraplegic, who used the device to successfully control an artificial hand via cables
running from the implant—a grid of 96 electrodes implanted in the motor cortex. This
marked the first time an implanted device within the brain had allowed control of an
artificial limb.263 A similar system was used in Berlin later that year.264 The BrainGate
team is currently working towards “developing and testing a novel broadband wireless,
rechargeable, fully implantable version of the brainsensor,”265 as the original BrainGate
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required cables which connected to the implanted chip via an adapter on the scalp. The
new BrainGate2, a 4x4mm silicon electrode array, is in pilot clinical studies with animal
subjects at Massachusetts General Hospital. Cyberkinetics hopes to make the BrainGate
BCI commercially available, indicating that it may be possible for healthy people to have
access to implantable BCIs that augment and extend their abilities, allowing them to
control external systems via thought.

2.5

DARPA BCI Initiatives

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Administration (DARPA), a research and
development arm of the United States Department of Justice, has had a significant
presence in the BCI community. In 2008 they began testing the Cognitive Technology
Threat Warning System (CT2WS).266 “Basically, a soldier wears an
electroencephalogram (EEG) cap that monitors his brain signals as he watches the feed
from a 120-megapixel, tripod-mounted, electro-optical video camera with a 120-degree
field of view.”267 The system’s basic function is to couple the speed of the computer with
the analytical skills of the human mind. The brain perceives tiny changes in movement
within the soldier’s field of vision, most of which is not consciously registered. The
system uses these tiny electrical pulses of brain activity to highlight portions of the video,
in order to draw the full attention of the soldier to a particular area. The goal is to allow
soldiers to scan their surroundings, while a computer system analyzes when motion or a
potential threat is unconsciously perceived, and to draw attention to that spot. In testing,
the CT2WS on its own identified 810 false alarms per hour—things such as birds or
swaying branches. To the system, these were perceived as potential threats. “When a
human wearing the EEG cap was introduced, the number of false alarms dropped to only
5 per hour, out of a total of 2,304 target events per hour, and a 91 percent successful
target recognition rate.”268 The human mind is able to recognize the difference between
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environmental factors that a computer cannot, but the CT2WS system speeds up how fast
a human can recognize actual threats.
Another project of DARPA’s, titled Restorative Encoding Memory Integration
Neural Device (REMIND), which has received $16.8 million in funding since 2008,269 is
described as “trying to make a biometric model of the hippocampus, in order to produce a
neural prosthesis to aid memory.”270 The greatest obstacle for the project is uncovering
how the brain stores and codes memories. The project work is primarily conducted by the
University of Southern California, in partnership with Wake Forest University and the
University of Kentucky, and aims to “develop a neural prosthesis for a replacement of
memory function lost due to central brain region damage or disease.”271 The research
focuses on areas of the hippocampus used for long-term memory retention in healthy
patients, in order to build a microchip that can replace portions of the hippocampus
entirely by redirecting information that would normally be destined for the hippocampus
to an implant instead. The idea is for healthy minds to be augmented in order to more
accurately store memories, as well as recall them in greater detail.
In the same vein as DARPA’s typical naming conventions, REPAIR
(Reorganization and Plasticity to Accelerate Injury Recovery) looks to discover how the
brain analyzes and organizes information.272 The project, lead by teams at Stanford
University and Brown University, has a two-year budget of $14.9 million,273 and has
three primary objectives: “restore impaired sensory function,” advance the ability to
communicate directly through BCIs, and to control external devices and systems.
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DARPA’s most ambitious and overtly militaristic project is Silent Talk, a research
initiative aiming to allow soldiers to communicate—to both each other and external
computer systems—solely via thought. Silent Talk is funded under DARPA’s Brain
Machine Interfaces Program, which “is providing tens of millions of dollars to MIT,
Duke and other universities.”274 DARPA’s interest in “giving U.S. soldiers the ability to
control tanks, fly planes, and share information purely by thought,” dates back to at least
2005,275 but only officially received funding in 2009 with a $4 million initial
investment.276 Silent Talk currently has three objectives: “First, try to map a person’s
EEG patterns to his or her individual words. Then, see if those patterns are
generalizable—if everyone has similar patterns. Last, construct a fieldable pre-prototype
that would decode the signal and transmit over a limited range.”277 The intention is to
accelerate reaction times, and to allow soldiers to “control more complex systems than
their hands can currently manage.”278 As a project funded and managed by the United
States military, the implications for future war are troublesome.279
In June of 2013, DARPA expanded its BCI research with funding to four projects
geared more towards commercial production of BCIs than purely academic or militaryoriented. The first newly funded by DARPA is a 3D-printed electrode designed by S12, a
BCI research group based in Boston. Cognionics is a company developing portable EEG
equipment that monitors bioelectric signals from the brain via a portable, low-cost,
Bluetooth-powered system. Design Interactive, another firm now funded by DARPA, is
working on a DIY EEG headset using existing, off-the-shelf parts. DARPA is also
funding OpenBCI, which is an opensource platform to develop EEG-based BCIs. This
easily allows institutions, independent agencies and even hobbyists to develop their own
BCI applications. “There are a lot of reasons DARPA wants to crowdsource brainwave
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research. The data can be used to refine soldier training, treat post-traumatic stress
disorder, study the effects of torture, triage medical diagnoses on the battlefield, harness
the human subconscious.”280
In 2003, DARPA funded a research project at Duke University, led by Miguel
Nicolelis and John Chapin. The team implanted electrodes into the brains of rhesus
monkeys to study their neural activity. The monkeys were given a joystick that controlled
an external robotic arm, which the monkeys quickly figured out how to use. Nicolelis and
Chapin found patterns emerged when the monkeys used the joystick in different ways,
allowing them to “predict how the robot arm would move in response to the activity in
the monkey’s motor cortex. In trial after trial, their predictions matched what really
happened.”281 Nicolelis and Chapin had effectively discovered what regions of the brain
were responsible for specific movements. They then disconnected the joystick, and
instead let their BCI software move the robotic arm based on what the monkeys thought,
before they even used the inactive joystick. With a slight delay in the BCI, the monkeys
would use the joystick, and the robotic arm would move accordingly. In later studies, the
monkeys learnt to control the robotic arm without using the joystick at all, indicating that
the brain was no longer sending signals to the monkey’s arm to move the joystick, and
that the monkey had “incorporated an external device as a natural extension of the
body.”282 Nicolelis has since gone on to give monkeys control of a virtual avatar that
allows for multiple limbs to move independently of each other; the research indicates that
groups of neurons control movement rather than single neurons as previously believed.283
These samples of DARPA’s many BCI projects showcase the diverse ways in
which this technology is developing. While many of these projects have stated goals of
repairing cognitive capacities for the wounded, it is easy to see how they extend
themselves to enhancing those same capacities. Indeed much of the research done on
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BCIs lends itself to enhancing communication for military purposes, with a clear
possibility for future civilian applications. DARPA—as with many of the other research
teams I have showcased—are beginning to look to BCIs enhancement not as a science
fictional idea of the distant future, but rather as a reality not too far off from today. Many
research outfits outline a distinct plan for moving BCI research increasingly towards
enhancing human cognition.

2.6

Aspirations of Current Research

At present, it is implausible to implant BCI-type devices into healthy human brains
simply to experiment with ways in which to enhance communication—the safety risks
284

are too great to undertake without any serious medical necessity.

Thus nearly all

implanted BCIs are confined to therapeutic purposes. However, transhumanist Ramez
Naam notes, “The urge to help and heal will propel the design of more sophisticated
implants and safer surgical procedures to implant them. It will teach us more about how
the brain works, and it will gradually introduce the idea of brain implants to the general
public. This will blunt the shock that will come when people begin using these implants
to enhance themselves rather than cure disease.”
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As medical research into BCIs

continues, along with myriad research into neuroscience done across the world, the body
of knowledge as to how the brain functions increases. With increased knowledge of how
parts of the brain work together, BCI research and development becomes more advanced,
increasingly the likelihood that BCIs may become commonplace as an enhancement. And
it is not only transhumanists who see the plausibility in BCI enhancement: the Natural
Science Foundations reported in 2002 that in the coming decades, the convergence of
nanotechnology with neuroscience and communication technologies may make BCIs
affordable and widespread.
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Internet and communicate with others, and some believe this may even be possible by
2030.

287

Retinal implants like the Dobelle Vision System

288

289

and Second Sight

bypass

the damaged or injured human eye to transmit visual data received through small cameras
directly onto the visual cortex. The effect is that blind humans have been able to regain
some level of vision, with some even able to drive.

290

Technologies such as these

demonstrate that digital information can be sent directly into and processed by the human
brain. This would suggest that other visual data can be streamed into the brain as well,
such as video or images from remote locations, so long as it is received by the implant
and transmitted to the visual cortex. Similarly, cochlear implants bypass the eardrum
entirely by receiving sound, turning it to digital information, and transmitting it directly
into the cochlear nerve. These two technologies together—retinal and cochlear
implants—suggest that digital information may be used to augment healthy humans and
their senses. External data received from the Internet may be transmitted directly into the
cochlea and visual cortex, and allow humans to superimpose other information over their
existing perceptions.
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Aside from these hypothetical future BCIs, many researchers today express
interest in refining and improving upon existing BCIs. It is clear that research will
continue to improve upon existing devices, making the possibility for cognitive
enhancement increasingly a reality. However, while much of BCI research takes place in
medical contexts, there is considerable growth in BCI development by independent
groups of engineers and computer scientists. These groups have yet to look to implanted
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BCIs, but their work on non-invasive systems is impressive, as many developers can
292

construct primitive games and applications in a matter of days.

While researchers

working with therapeutic and medical BCIs are subject to ethical review in both the
design and development process, as well as with human subjects and distributing these
technologies to patients, those who develop BCIs within the realm of engineering and
computer science—namely those working on BCI-based consumer products and
applications—are not subject to those same ethical evaluations.
So far I’ve shown that there is a considerable amount of discussion about
cognitive enhancement, through a variety of technologies. I’ve showcased BCIs as both
ttherapeutic tool and an enhancement device. At this point, I will turn to look at the ethics
involved with BCIs, both in theory, in development, and in distribution. Many BCIs are
developing without ethics playing any major part for designers or businesspersons. As the
following chapter will show, those engaged in talking about the ethics of such
enhancements are missing this fundamental issue: BCIs are not the same as other forms
of cognitive enhancement, and demand attention sooner rather than later to prevent the
multitude of negative outcomes both transhumanists and their opponents debate.
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3

Ethics of BCI Enhancement
Besides, we have our stability to think of. We don’t want to change. Every
change is a menace to stability. That’s another reason why we’re so chary
of applying new inventions. Every discovery in pure science is potentially
subversive; even science must sometimes be treated as a possible enemy.
Yes, even science.
—Aldous Huxley. Brave New World
Today’s problems cannot be solved if we still think the way we thought
when we created them.
—Albert Einstein

3.1

Introduction

Human enhancement has been part of ethical discussions for some time, but there is a
lack of consensus as to where within ethics it falls. When talking about cognitive
enhancement, many insist on using emerging bioethical frameworks; bioethics is
relatively new field that gained prominence in the 1970s, which argues traditional ethics
required a reworking to address how technology and science alter human bodies and
environments.

293

When using bioethical frameworks, cognitive enhancement debates

tend to look to the medical applications of cognitive enhancement: pharmaceutical drugs
and genetic manipulation. The problem here is that cognitive enhancement is a rather
broad category, and BCI-type enhancements are at times mentioned within bioethical
discussion, but hardly—if ever—discussed in detail. The assumption is that cognitive
enhancements will arise from medical advances made for therapeutic purposes and then
applied to already healthy minds. Because of this assumption, BCI cognitive
enhancements that are developed outside of medicine and healthcare are ignored in the
ethical discussion around biomedical cognitive enhancements, leaving them to develop
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unregulated by private companies. Moreover, transhumanists point out that cognitive
enhancements, and the type of ethical concerns they create, “are not readily addressed in
terms of the traditional bioethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, and justice; they
raise fundamental questions about our self-understanding as individuals and human
beings, the meaning of human dignity, the nature of human community and society, and
the purposes of medicine.”

294

Despite disagreements as to whether traditional ethical frameworks are sufficient to
address emerging cognitive enhancements, the majority of ethical analyses of cognitive
enhancement do tend to fall within two primary frameworks: utilitarianism, and
deontological ethics. Transhumanists and proenhancement advocates favor utilitarian
ethics as a way of justifying human enhancement for the betterment of humanity, while
bioconservatives and critics of enhancement tend to utilize deontological arguments,
mainly that humans have a responsibility to refuse enhancements if they at all threaten
what it means to be human. However, as I will argue, both of these frameworks fail to
realize that BCI enhancements do not belong in the same category as medical cognitive
enhancements like pharmaceuticals, as they develop largely through independent groups
of engineers, computer scientists, and businesspersons. They are at present altogether
bypassing the rigorous ethical evaluations that accompany any and all medical
technologies, and are subsequently avoiding regulation. Both sides of the debate willingly
acknowledge cognitive enhancements require ethical evaluation and regulation, but fail to
realize BCIs are not all developed within the medical community, and thus require
immediate attention in order to ensure proper policies can be enacted. BCI enhancements,
while often mentioned, are utterly absent in ethical discussion. Furthermore, these ethical
debates are too often focused on vague assumptions about either human nature or what is
best for humanity, and fail to have very much to say with regards to the actual ethical
development and use of cognitive enhancers in any practical sense.

294

S. Matthew Liao, Julian Savulescu, and David Wasserman, “The Ethics of Enhancement,” Journal of
Applied Philosophy 25, no. 3 (2008). 159

68

3.2

Transhumanist Ethics

The ethics of human enhancement, for the overwhelming majority of transhumanist
authors, utilizes at least one of the four primary tenets of utilitarianism: consequentialism;
the maximization principle; the theory of value; and the scope of morality. Taking these
tenets one at a time, transhumanists primarily focus on consequentialism, an ethical
framework that puts full emphasis on the outcome of actions and decisions, rather than
295

the motivations or intentions of said actions.

From this standpoint, transhumanists see

human enhancement technologies (HET) as a means to achieving a better, happier, more
stable society than what currently exists, with an emphasis on eradicating—or at least
diminishing—various societal inequalities, including but not limited to racial and
gendered prejudices, and the immensely uneven distribution of wealth. For
transhumanists, “the good of scientific research and technological development is in their
proven ability to facilitate wealthier, healthier, longer and happier lives.”

296

Take for

example the changes in average life expectancy in the last 100 years: in 1900, average
life expectancy in America was 47 years, and by 2002 that number had increased to 77.
While this fact can be—and often is—misconstrued to suggest that Americans are
altogether living longer lives, the change in life expectancy has much more to do with a
radical reduction in infant and child deaths. Prenatal care and education, medicine and
technology, and public healthcare systems have become accessible to a far greater
number of citizens in America.
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These types of technological innovations—from a

transhumanist perspective—indicate that technological advances that initially increase
health and happiness for the wealthy and upper class society, can and do eventually
become widespread, and transhumanists believe emerging technologies will follow
similar trends. While some transhumanists propose that the consequentialist endpoint
would be a posthuman era, other transhumanists and pro-enhancement advocates more
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simply suggest that technology will be crucial to fostering a better world. Regardless,
transhumanist utilitarian ethics generally have the same conclusions: the best course of
action with regard to cognitive enhancements is to actively pursue developing and
distributing them in order to improve quality of life. Hughes strongly insists that
emerging technologies, in conjunction with ethical attentiveness to public policy and
economic structures, are key to improving the world and quality of life, as he writes,
“Democracy and technology have and will increase human intelligence, and increasing
human intelligence will encourage liberty, democracy and the innovation of new
technology.”
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For David Pearce, cofounder of the World Transhumanist Association, the
facilitation of technological development and the pursuit of human enhancement presents
an incredible utilitarian opportunity, in that “ethically it is imperative that the sort of
unspeakable suffering characteristic of the last few hundred million years on earth should
299

never recur elsewhere.”

For Pearce, HETs are crucial to reducing suffering on a global

level, particularly in regards to the potential for cognitive enhancements to allow humans
to construct altogether new ways of cultivating a better world. Furthermore, Pearce
argues that pursuing human enhancement is a moral obligation, not only for humans, but
to also “reconstruct the natural order entirely so that any other beings capable of suffering
will likewise be happy.”
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If more intelligent minds can create better social and political

systems in order to benefit the greatest number of people, then pushing resources towards
BCI cognitive enhancement development is, for transhumanists, ethically sound. For
Pearce, human enhancement is a key component in achieving a utilitarian outcome: the
actual types of enhancements and how they are applied and distributed, is secondary to
the intended outcome.
More radically proenhancement advocates—including some transhumanists like
Ramez Naam—argue that “if enhancing out bodies does not hurt anyone (other than
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possibly ourselves), then why should we be prevented from doing so?”

301

A key

component of transhumanism—included in a number of transhumanist texts

302,303

—is the

concept of morphological freedom, the right for individuals to choose which
enhancements to apply to themselves, an argument closely tied to the ethical principle of
autonomy. Transhumanists insist that individuals should have complete authority over
which—if any—enhancements they apply to themselves and their children, with an
emphasis that no enhancements should be imposed by the state. They see the ability to
choose what is best for oneself as critical to cultivating a better world, but some types of
cognitive enhancements may threaten the sense of autonomy that they are supposed to
support. Consider a BCI that aids an individual in accessing and sorting through massive
amounts of data, just as a word processor or database does. If that system were
implemented into a human brain, it might enable an individual to better evaluate and act
out various situations in their lives; at the same time, “If an enhancement, such as moodaltering drugs or neural implants, interferes with or alters our deliberative process, then it
is an open question whether or not we are truly acting freely while under the influence of
304

enhancement.”

For bioconservative Leon Kass, the concept of having a BCI

enhancement severely threatens an individual’s autonomy, as he likens connecting a
computer directly to the human brain to having a ‘little demon’ inside your mind that
305

makes decisions for you.

While his stance may be dramatic and overtly religious in

tone, the general problem of that BCIs may have impact on our ability to reason and
analyze data and situations in a way that is detrimental to our sense of self-determination.
Some worry that “if we imagine a world of cyborgs wirelessly connected to each other
via the Internet, it is clear we may need to rethink concepts of what constitutes autonomy
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of an individual, as the boundaries of individual body and mind seem to blur in such a
306

world.”

While transhumanist arguments clearly insist on the highest level of autonomy
possible when choosing enhancements, simultaneously ignore myriad networked effects
from individuals enhancing their minds through BCIs, namely, the possibility for new
social hierarchies to emerge, or existing ones to worsen. Even hypothetical cognitive
enhancements, such as pharmaceuticals and BCIs, offer stronger cognitive capacities, but
in different ways that are not necessarily equal. Those who have access to more efficient
enhancements may very well still have an advantage over enhanced minds using ‘lesser’
cognitive enhancements. Transhumanist literature addresses this issue in several ways,
and varies between authors: there is no clear consensus even amongst transhumanists as
to how to address this problem or if it needs addressing at all. The first, and most
radically libertarian position, argues that the maximization principle of utilitarianism does
not require equality as an outcome, but rather equality of opportunity: that all citizens
have equal opportunity to access enhancements, regardless if they are publicly funded or
paid for out of pocket to private developers.
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The argument stresses that there have

always been natural inequalities amongst humans of virtually every culture, and that there
is a distinction between injustice (such as distributing BCI enhancements solely to
308

already privileged people) and misfortune.

This argument insists that even in pursuing

a better world for all humans, it is not necessary to completely make all humans equal,
but rather only to increase quality of life and access to healthcare for everyone.
Some transhumanist ethics investigate the way enhancements of any kind,
including BCIs, utilize a commutative justice framework, “which calls for fairness in
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competition.”

309

These types of ethics examine the ways enhancement technologies will

affect situations where the value of the enhancement is positional rather than intrinsic:
The main issue here is distributive justice. In the enhancement debate, this
is typically associated with the question whether the enhancement at issue
is an intrinsic or positional good: does it confer an intrinsic benefit (for
example, a longer or healthier life) or a benefit only in comparison to non310
enhanced people (such as enhanced height)?
However, this comparison between intrinsic and positional good is often ambiguous,
especially in terms of BCI enhancements. A BCI that allows a user to access information
quicker is intrinsic in some sense (freeing up an individual to multitask more easily or
access medical help quicker in an emergency), and is also a positional good in another
sense (setting new standards for productivity that unenhanced individuals cannot compete
with). As a result, this type of commutative justice framework can only be useful when
applied to specific BCIs, rather than any broad categorization of cognitive enhancement.
The transhumanist take on the maximization principle of utilitarianism creates
contradiction as to how the greatest result can be achieved: on one hand, transhumanists
advocate giving enhancements to the worst off in society first (distributive justice),
before attempting to then as evenly as possible raise all members of society to new levels
of cognitive capacities. With BCIs however, this type of distributive justice is impractical
due to high costs of devices and surgery to implant them. As many suggest, it will take a
considerable amount of time and effort to make BCI implants sophisticated enough—not
to mention safe—to implant in healthy brains. However, when and if they are reasonable
to implant as a form of enhancement, initial access will likely be severely limited by the
high costs of surgery and the BCI hardware itself.
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As a result, the first BCI

enhancements beyond therapeutic uses are most likely to go to those who can afford
them—not to mention that existing BCIs for ALS patients are already too costly for
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insurance companies to cover, so they too are distributed based on who can afford them.
In contrast to distributing BCIs—along with other types of cognitive enhancements—to
those who need them the most in order to function, transhumanists also believe that
enhanced minds—not necessarily posthuman but with at least a distinctly larger cognitive
capacity—will be at a better vantage point to address current societal and global issues
312

(climate change, poverty, warfare, to name a few).

This would suggest giving BCI

enhancements to humans who already possess high cognitive capacities in the hopes that
they will then be able to use those cognitive abilities to best benefit all of humanity.
These two ethical stances rely on two competing forms of justice ethics, where resources
are allocated based on need, or on potential merit. Transhumanists seem to be advocating
for both simultaneously.
The issue comes down to how limited resources are to be allocated, either by
providing for the disadvantaged at present, or to invest in posthuman minds for the hope
of a better future. Within the Transhumanist FAQ, they pose the ethical question
“Shouldn’t we concentrate on current problems such as improving the situation of the
poor, rather than putting efforts into planning for the ‘far’ future?”
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to which they

answer, “We should do both.” Unfortunately, this answer entirely avoids the basic
ethical principle of how limited resources should be distributed amongst citizens, and
demonstrates a major weakness in the ethics of transhumanists. Many transhumanists
seem to forget—or willfully ignore—that we do not live in a post-scarcity world, and that
pursuing all options simultaneously is impractical, and violates basic ethical principles.
Transhumanist utilitarianism seems to forget that the resources required to fund, develop,
and distribute enhancements are already limited. If BCI enhancements were to develop
from within the realm of healthcare—as much of current BCI research is already doing,
It would place further demands on medical resources, including time on
physicians’ and nurses’ calendars, diagnostic efforts to assess cognitive
symptoms, the time needed for informed consent discussions, testing to
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monitor side effects, and medical treatment for adverse effects when they
occur. Since medical resources are finite, and in some quarters scarce,
their just distribution should first ensure that the medical needs of the sick
are met before enlarging the healthcare industry routinely to accommodate
314
enhancement requests from the healthy.
It is clear that even in highly developed parts of the world, access to healthcare and
medicine is nowhere near perfect, and all societies face problems of distributing limited
resources such as access to doctors and physicians, healthcare facilities, and even access
to information and communication technologies like cellphones and the Internet. For
some, the prospect of allocating medical resources towards enhancement rather than
315

therapy is unethical to begin with.

From this position, a transhumanist utilitarian

framework would suggest that the greatest outcome would be to utilize existing resources
to first address existing illnesses and impairments, before developing technologies with
the sole purpose of enhancing the healthy.
Several transhumanists take the position that distributing cognitive enhancements
to the worst off in society—those who might require them in order to have the same
cognitive capacities as ‘healthy’ individuals—is the best ethical course of action to
pursue. This type of distributive justice stems from Rawls’ “Justice as Fairness”
principle, which Julian Savulescu uses to argue that, “enhancement increases justice
rather than injustice.”
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This stance proposes that “The state has an obligation

to…ensure that pre-existing inequalities are not worsened and that harm is not done by
the use of ineffective or dangerous technologies,”

317

and that access to cognitive

enhancements are either made available to everyone, or available to no one. It is the
responsibility of the state to regulate access, and to ensure cognitive enhancements are
affordable to all citizens. In rebuttal, Wagner points out that Savulescu’s take on
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Rawlsian justice ignores “the problem that, probably, the worst off in society would not
be the only ones to benefit from an efficient enhancement.”

318

The argument here is that

any attempt to regulate HETs in order to first enhance the worst off in society and level
the playing field prior to enhancing humans beyond their current normative levels may
fail, as others will enhance themselves at the same time, thus maintaining the level of
inequality but simply elevating it for both sides.
It seems evident how unlikely it is that only the worst off would try to gain access
to cognitive enhancements. In terms of BCI enhancements, a Rawlsian approach can only
make sense when applied to specific BCIs: any P300-type device (outlined in chapter
two) would hardly increase productivity for healthy individuals—it would more likely
hinder productivity. If however BCIs become much more efficient, and allow users to
type messages as fast as thought itself, then it’s likely healthy individuals would seek
these enhancements just as much as locked-in ALS patients might, so distributing them
based on need becomes increasingly difficult as BCIs become increasingly more
sophisticated. The problem of fair distribution becomes even more complex when
determining who would benefit the most from a BCI enhancement, especially when
healthy-minded people may be able to increase their cognition far greater than someone
with an existing impairment.
For Peter Singer, the ethical distribution of healthcare should be based on
examining who would receive the largest incremental change in quality of life, a
utilitarian framework fitting with transhumanism. Using this type of framework, a BCI
enhancement may appear to give a larger cognitive boost to a healthy person compared to
a disabled person.
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Imagine normative cognitive capacities could be measured and

assigned a numeric value, which for our purposes we will say is 100. If a disabled person
were to have a cognitive value of 80 in comparison, and there was an available BCI
enhancement that could push that number to 100, then the incremental value is 20—if
that same device boosted a healthy individual from 100 to 130, it would, under this type
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of framework, be distributed to the healthy individual solely as an enhancement rather
than as a therapeutic tool for those with greater need, simply because the utilitarian
320

outcome is greatest.

This perspective looks at who could make the most out of any

given cognitive enhancement, rather than who needs it to function at a normative level,
and thus may privilege the healthy prior to healing the sick. Utilitarian frameworks that
emphasize enhancement distribution based on the greatest outcome at a societal level
often ignore outcomes for individuals and the disadvantaged. Habermas critiques
utilitarian approaches to human enhancement for disregarding what constitutes a good
life for an individual, “provided the outcome is equally just for all, [transhumanists] have
321

no concern for the behaviors that it produces.”

In this light, things that seem to

encourage equal opportunity for all do not take into account the values of varying
cultures and subcultures, and insist upon a singular view of what a “benefit” or
“enhancement” means. Take for example cochlear implants, a therapeutic device
intended to correct the inequalities between deaf and healthy individuals. In a utilitarian
perspective, cochlear implants provide equal opportunity to hear, given that improving
hearing will actually be considered a benefit to those it is provided to. Sweirta and Rip
point out that “The promise of allowing the deaf to hear again was contested by the deaf
322

community, with its own culture, and now officially recognized language,”

which

demonstrates that what was considered a utilitarian benefit in theory was—at least
partially—rejected in practice, because cultural values had not been taken into account.
Similarly, a BCI made and distributed with the utilitarian goal of providing equal
cognitive capacities to individuals deemed “lesser” than normative levels may in fact be
rejected by those it was intended for. Transhumanists often assume that enhancements
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made to “level the playing field” will be interpreted as enhancements, and that
individuals will want to enhance themselves.
Particularly troubling about using a distributive justice framework for cognitive
enhancement is how exactly the “worst off” may be determined. There is a severe lack of
discussion as to who may decide who are cognitively inferior’ and what criteria may be
used to evaluate individuals. This part of using a distributive justice approach exemplifies
the idea that transhumanism is an intensification of humanism,
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namely, of a sort of

hierarchical thinking stemming from the Enlightenment, in that it privileges science and
the idea of progress above all else, and in this case, passing judgment on what humans
ought to be.
Some fear that BCI enhancements will give enhanced minds competitive
advantages over non-enhanced minds, with a common example of individuals accessing
data via the Internet without others around them being aware of it, in exam situations or
any kind of business negotiation, which may give them an advantage over others. If in
fact BCI enhancements were to become commonplace—or at least common amongst
those who could initially afford them—the integrity of competitive situations like
university exams would be compromised, as students would be able to connect to the
Internet or other devices to access information and easily cheat. Without strong
regulation as to who has access to BCIs—particularly inconspicuous implanted ones—
and where they can be used, these cognitive enhancements challenge the value of
memorizing information for educational purposes: the data will always be easily
324

accessible to enhanced users.

Central to the ethics of cognitive enhancement, and enhancement in general, is the
issue of how these technologies may create new norms and standards unenhanced minds
cannot compete. The problem raises concern for how cognitive enhancements may
eventually coerce those who refuse enhancement towards adapting these technologies in
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order to have equal opportunity with regards to career options.

325

If an enhancement were

to become relatively commonplace among a given industry, and become a standard for a
new level of productivity, it would impede an individual’s freedom to choose what
enhancements to apply to his or herself—if they chose to enhance themselves at all.
Transhumanists insist individuals be given full authority over what enhancements they
choose, but fail to address how individuals may be pressured to use those same
enhancements. Wagner points out that Savulescu willfully ignores problems of
coercion,

326

which never seems to appear in any great detail in transhumanist literature,

or at least with substantive ethical consideration. However, transhumanists often point to
the ways previous technologies or techniques (such as literacy) initially enhanced the
few, and indeed gave them a temporary advantage over those without equal access.
Written texts, as well as instruction on how to read well, were originally only accessible
to typically wealthy individuals, and took a considerable amount of time to become
commonplace.
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Using literacy and written texts as an example, transhumanists draw a

parallel to emerging technologies: just because they may privilege the few at first, and
worsen existing inequalities between classes, it is not a reason to reject pursuing these
technologies entirely. While some bioconservatives suggest abandoning human
enhancement altogether, and working towards a global ban, transhumanists see this as
unethical, as “The right thing to do is to make as many better as we can, not to make no328

one better.”

If an opportunity for enhancement is available, transhumanists see it as an

ethical responsibility to pursue it in some way.
Some transhumanists concede that despite efforts to distribute enhancements to
the worst off first, the wealthiest begin enhancing themselves early on, giving them a
competitive edge. Many transhumanists suggest that even if cognitive enhancements
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initially become commonplace amongst the wealthy, they are likely to ‘trickle-down’
over time and that this ‘transition period’ is not a serious problem: “Transhumanists
acknowledge this effect as a short-term issue; early adopters of new possibilities will pay
a high price for them, but they also point to the powerful tendency for technology prices
329

to go down over time.”

While this may be true with many commercial products,

Buchanan points out that this assumption is particularly dangerous, as “Even if valuable
innovations tend to become widely available over time, they may do so too slowly.”

330

BCI enhancements may give a tremendous advantage to those who can access them,
allowing inequalities amongst social classes to worsen dramatically before these same
technologies become more easily accessible. Additionally, because of the invasiveness of
BCI enhancements and the high cost of development and implementation, they may very
well never trickle-down to all members of society.
What may be the most significant problem with transhumanist ethics—and wholely
incorporated throughout transhumanists ideology—is the confidence placed in
technologies to construct a better world, without identifying specific ways technology
will lead towards it, contribute to it, and without what some consider to be a sufficient
amount of scientific facts to support this outcome. From this perspective, some liken
331

transhumanism to religion,

which even some prolific transhumanists like Bostrom

admit the similarity: the better, more prosperous posthuman era that transhumanists
propose is, in many ways, similar to concepts of the afterlife, in that it is a belief in a
future that cannot be fully imagined or comprehended by humans as we exist now.
Transhumanists do believe that as science and technology progress, their predictions for
what enhancement technologies will arise, and what social impacts they will have if used
carefully and with careful ethical and regulatory considerations, will prove their
hypothesis of a posthuman era.
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The very basis of their ethical arguments that the

world will be better place is founded in not being able to determine how exactly to get
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there, and what in what ways it will be better, since posthumans will, according to
transhumanists, innovate technologies and social structures inconceivable to our
unenhanced minds today.

3.3

Bioconservative ethics

Critics of transhumanist ethics, often referred to as bioconservatives or bioluddites,
approach human enhancement technologies from both utilitarian and deontological
frameworks, with the most conservative writers focusing on deontological arguments,
trying to determine “…to what extent human implants violate moral rules or principles,
such as human dignity, bodily integrity, autonomy and self-determination or nondiscrimination.”
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For these authors, the value of an ethical decision is in the moral

intentions of an action, rather than its consequences.

334

From this stance,

transhumanism’s critics argue that to enhance the brain beyond its natural capacities
would risk damaging human nature, and with it, altering our very ability to uphold
morality. Furthermore, they suggest that cognitive enhancements will worsen
socioeconomic inequalities, and increase competitiveness in society in such a way that
violates moral codes of fairness.
Early deontological ethics, particularly those of Immanuel Kant, relied on
religious foundations in determining concepts of right and wrong as being defined by
335

what was “commanded or forbidden by God.”

These ethics turned to ideas of natural

law and human reason as a means to engage ethical dilemmas. However, in contemporary
ethical debates, such as those centered around cognitive enhancements, these religioustype deontological ethics tend to be easily dismissed, as “these concepts are too general
and too distant for consistent use in formulating methods for approaching ethical
problems in various culture and everyday situations.”
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bioconservative ethicists tend to reach out to more contemporary ethical frameworks,
such as Hans Jonas’ technological ethics.
Jonas’ ethics are highly precautionary, as he believes that exploring myriad
negative outcomes is far more crucial than offering the possibility for more ideal
outcomes, as “We are not unsure about evil when it comes our way, but of the good we
337

become sure only via the experience of its opposite.”

He argues that the purpose of

ethics should be confronting the ways an outcome of an ethical problem may worsen
existing problems, or create altogether new ones. For Jonas, proposing that an emerging
technology may allow for a particular result, say in the example of BCI enhancements,
that humans will be able to increase productivity and extend cognitive capacities, may be
likened to hitting a bull’s eye on a target. He writes that the wager of using a new
technology is not a matter of whether it will produce the ideal outcome or not,’ a simple
hit or miss scenario; rather, a hit is only one possible option, while there exist a multitude
338

of ways to miss.

Thus for Jonas, it is imperative to seriously consider as many negative

consequences first, and then wager those against the possibility for success.
More important to the transhumanist debate is Jonas’ take on ethical actions based
on speculative future scenarios, which he sees as being unethical in itself. He writes that
traditional ethics, “was of the here and now of occasion as they arise between men, of the
339

recurrent, typical situations of private and public life.”

Putting his patriarchal language

aside, Jonas’ ethics of technology starts from the argument that ethics needs to look more
to the future than it traditionally has done. He however qualifies that argument to pay
particular attention to current developments in science and technology in order to discern
trends and extrapolate them to predict possible future outcomes.

340

This qualification

would suggest speculation on future conditions is crucial to ethical evaluation today.
However, Jonas also argues, “if the future conditions upon which ethics reflects were
purely speculative in any radical sense, the ethical advice that might follow from such
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reflection could not lead to anything of consequence.”

341

Here it seems Jonas’ ethics of

technology lends itself to both transhumanists and bioconservatives: he argues
speculation on the future of technology is critical to ethical evaluations at the present and
near future, but also insists that pure speculative scenarios for the future do not contribute
to ethical discussions today. He admits “the impossibility to predict future inventions,
which would amount to preinventing them,”

342

while also suggesting extrapolating

technology trends may supply a reliable foundation for ethical debate. From this point, it
appears transhumanists and pro-enhancement advocates such as Kurzweil may be
supported by Jonas’ ethical stance, while simultaneously contributing to bioconservative
arguments that ethics should focus on current problems rather than distance future
possibilities. It would seem both sides reduce Jonas’ arguments to what best supports
their own arguments, while ignoring aspects that demonstrate the vast complexity of the
ethical issues at hand.
Fukuyama takes a similar stance when he proposes that the posthuman future may
very well be disastrous to not only society, but to individuals as well. While
transhumanists fervently debate Fukuyama’s arguments, he does examine human
enhancement from both utilitarian and deontological points of view. Fukuyama’s primary
concern about enhancement—from a utilitarian stance—is that enhancement technologies
are likely to become commercialized, and not state-subsidized or publicly funded. For
him, this would prevent the poor from accessing enhancements,
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and contribute to

greater inequalities amongst humans. Fukuyama’s main concern with enhancement is
“the politics of groups who argue on their behalf,”
concern.
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raising an altogether different

The bioconservative take on utilitarianism wagers that with existing methods
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of developing and distributing these technologies, injustices and inequalities will worsen
on a very large scale. Thus, these writers aim to enforce a greater distinction between
therapy and enhancement—a line that transhumanists argue will only increasingly blur—
in order to best heal the sick with the limited resources available.
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Proust points out

using cognitive enhancements for therapeutic uses, such as giving them to “subjects
347

confined in a paralyzed body, or deprived of a perception,”

is unanimously seen as

ethically acceptable amongst bioconservatives. The problem primarily lies in the slippery
slope of what constitutes enhancement.
Fukuyama approaches enhancement with a deep concern that the transhumanist
push towards a posthuman future may likely be “a future state of affairs in which the
348

traditional human might no longer be valued.”

Fukuyama’s fear of the posthuman

future—which transhumanists fully embrace—is that by changing the minds of humans,
we may inadvertently diminish the value of things humans currently hold dear, namely
human achievement and respect for one another. Some suggest that posthumans may
regard unenhanced humans as being less able to judge right and wrong, and to make
decisions that affect themselves and each other, and that that superiority may lead
posthumans to suggest that unenhanced minds should have “fewer participation rights in
the polity as their genetic superiors.”
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The argument that human enhancement may

damage, impede, or in some way negatively affect what it means to be human on a
connotative level is common amongst bioconservatives, and is one of the strongest
350

arguments in opposition to transhumanism.

This stance insists that human nature is
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crucial to not only giving value to human life and the things that humans give meaning
to, but that it may also be a key element in determining morality.

351

Tampering with human minds, through any cognitive enhancement, may hamper
our ability to ethically evaluate situations as we do now; augmented minds may disregard
aspects of what humans today hold to be meaningful, ranging from interpersonal
relationships to the sentimental value of objects, which to bioconservatives, is an
extremely undesirable future. Jonas’ ethics of technology really come to light here, as he
writes, “Never must the existence of the essence of man as a whole be made a stake in the
352

hazards of action.”

While transhumanists welcome an era where humans have evolved

to more intelligent, stronger beings with extended lifespans, bioconservatives stress that
the possibility in altering human nature in a negative way, however unintentional it may
be, is too strong an ethical risk to take. However, debates on what constitutes human
nature, whether BCI enhancements threaten human nature at all and if so how, and what
value human nature arguments have in regards cognitive enhancement, are central to
ethical discussions on HET.
Buchanan’s definition of human nature tends to be amongst the most widely
accepted and well defined, which he describes as “a set of dispositions that all (or at least
most) humans have and that shape behavior across a wide range of human activities,
353

regardless of cultural contest, throughout human history.”

For nearly all proponents in

the debate on cognitive enhancement, human nature is, despite attempts to define and
encapsulate it, unclear and amorphous. Jonas admits “the essentially unfathomable nature
of man,”
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which either side of the debate use to their advantage: while transhumanists

attempt to discredit arguments made on the basis of human nature (described in greater
detail later on), bioconservatives use the ambiguity of human nature as a reason to be
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cautious with enhancement. Fukuyama argues that “a fixed, if inarticulate,
conceptualization of the human is crucial to the organization of society, and this is why
debates about posthumans are so controversial.”

355

If we cannot define what human

nature is, then we cannot be certain how cognitive enhancements may affect it, thus, the
deontological ethical recommendation is to err on the side of caution rather than risk
irrevocably damaging our very nature. If cognitive enhancements threaten an individual’s
ability to act morally and autonomously, then they violate deontological principles.
BCI enhancements complicate this discussion, as most authors tend to focus on
enhancements that alter human minds through biological or chemical means; BCI
enhancements are seemingly less overt in their threat to altering human biology, which
356

some see as foundational to human nature.

They do, on the other hand, propose a

greater challenge to individual autonomy as they may supplement human memory,
analytical abilities and capacity for reason by coupling human capacities with mechanical
ones. Thus, it is not altogether impossible to alter human nature, but, the case can be
made that technologies have always altered human nature in this way: Andy Clark points
out the concept of neural plasticity, that the human brain is able to adapt and in a sense
rewire itself in response to changes in behavior and even injury.
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When parts of the

brain are damaged, other sections may become more active over time to supplement and
make up for lost cognitive abilities. Clark uses this phenomenon to put forth the idea of
‘technological scaffolding,’ which “refers to the dynamic coupling between feedback
358

gained from tool use, and cognitive enhancement.”

For Clark, humans have always

extended their natural cognitive capacities through external technologies, such as maps,
books and computers, which have “enhanced our natural ability to remember, understand,
and reason.”
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This raises two major points with regards to BCI enhancements, the first

of which is that because the brain has always adapted to external technologies, it might be
said that it is human nature for the brain to rely on and adapt to external objects.
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Secondly, Clark’s argument would suggest that inserting external devices into the body is
merely a superficial change, and that accessing the Internet through a mobile phone or an
implanted BCI device are nearly identical in the result they produce. From this stance,
BCIs hold no particular importance over any other technology already in widespread use
360

that extends human cognitive capacities.

Buchanan offers a cogent rebuttal to bioconservative concerns over damaging
human nature by pointing to a glaring limitation to the argument, namely, that
bioconservatives believe human nature to be inherently good. Buchanan writes, “One
thing that most religious conceptions, folk conceptions, and evolutionary conceptions
361

have in common is that they do not restrict human nature to good characteristics,”

which for him, bioconservatives selectively ignore. They insist that human nature is
foundational to our ability to uphold morality and to pursue what is good, and to alter or
risk that nature would be unethical. David Pearce points out that, “Warfare, rape, famine,
pestilence, infanticide and child-abuse have existed since time immemorial. They are
quite ‘natural,’ whether from a historical, cross-cultural or sociological perspective,”
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indicating that human nature encompasses the capacity to harm other humans, animals,
and environment. From this stance, transhumanists disregard the argument that protecting
and preserving the natural capacity for moral behaviour in humans is ethically sound by
suggesting that preserving human nature not only protects good things, like capacity for
empathy and love, but also preserves bad things like the capacity for greed and cruelty.
Instead, transhumanists argue that from a deontological position, the better course of
action is to adapt human nature in order to foster humaneness, rather than preserve what
363

has historically been ‘natural.’

Bostrom writes, “One might say that if ‘human’ is what

we are, then ‘humane’ is what we, as humans, wish we were. Human nature is not a bad
place to start that journey, but we can’t fulfill that potential if we reject any progress past
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the starting point.”

364

This leads the debate on human nature away from the risk of

altering or damaging human nature in general, and instead towards looking at what
characteristics of traits associated with human nature are worth preserving or
encouraging, and which are detrimental or negative. Buchanan reasons that arguments
concerning human nature “tend to obscure rather than illuminate the debate over the
ethics of enhancement, and can be eliminated in favor of more cogent considerations,”
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which indicates that general deontological ethics should be contextualized and narrowed
down to specifics, which Buchanan exemplifies by writing,
It is conceivable that an enhancement of some human capacity would
damage some human capacity we rightly value, for example, our capacity
for empathizing with others. If this damage occurred, then our capacity to
achieve the good, to live well, might be seriously compromised, but not
because the capacity for empathy is a part of our nature; rather, because
the capacity for empathy is either itself an important component of our
366
good or instrumental for other goods, or both.
Furthermore, as Budinger and Budinger point out, ethical arguments that emerging
technologies violate some aspect of human nature have become outdated, as “in modern
societies throughout the world, these same concepts [of human nature and natural law]
seldom lead to similar conclusions by individuals dealing with ethical dilemmas. This is
because the concepts are too general and too distant for consistent use.”
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They critique

the use of deontological ethics by indicating that the principles of deontology are founded
in upholding tradition, rather than seeking innovative responses to new challenges. As
cognitive enhancements pose questions about the boundaries of individual minds and
bodies, as well as what constitutes human nature, deontological principles offer little in
terms of practical ethical solutions.
In a majority of literature on cognitive enhancements—whether via BCI,
pharmaceuticals or a number of other methods—there is no clear consensus as to how
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these technologies may have an impact on an individual’s moral capacity; this should be
obvious, either from the inability to perfectly predict the future impact of yet-to-bedeveloped technologies, or from the transhumanist perspective that we cannot possibly
know how smarter beings will act due to our own cognitive limitations. What is clear
however, is that there will be some sort of impact, either positive or negative or more
generally ambiguous, as virtually no arguments are made that cognitive enhancements
will have zero impact on human behavior. Thus, the debate turns toward ways in which
cognitive enhancements may be steered towards greater outcomes, in order to prevent the
dystopic predictions that many bioconservatives fear, and that transhumanists wish to
avoid. The transhumanist proposal for guiding the use of cognitive enhancements for the
betterment of all humans is to simultaneously pursue moral enhancements, a mainly
theoretical conception of technologies that stimulate stronger moral characteristics, such
as empathy and compassion. When discussing the ethical development and use of
cognitive enhancements of any kind, Liao, Savulescu and Wasserman conclude that
“Cognitive enhancement may be lethal unless is it accompanied by the substantial moral
368

enhancement of human beings,”

insisting that cognitive enhancements be coupled with

moral enhancement to ensure those who first access cognitive enhancements will be more
likely to use them in compassionate, humanitarian ways. While they admit that moral
enhancement as it currently stands is, “possible in principle, but practically remote,”
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there have been experiments that demonstrate moral enhancement may be achievable.
Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), a method of generating small electrical
currents in the brain through an external device, Young et. al. conducted a series of tests
where subjects were asked to make ethical judgments on a variety of scenarios. They
found that, “TMS applied to the right temporoparietal junction caused subjects to focus
more on the outcome of the act than the intention of the actor when judging permissibility
of the act. This was the case even when the agent’s intent was to harm another person, so
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long as the outcome of the agent’s action was innocuous.”

370

This experiment

demonstrates that the moral capacities of humans are susceptible to technological
influence, and thus moral enhancement may be possible.
However, moral enhancement technologies are far from feasible and are mostly
speculative—thus from an ethical stance they need hardly be considered a serious
problem for the present. This moves the debate of cognitive enhancement ethics away
from theoretical situations and toward ways ethics can be used to achieve actual results,
namely by informing policy. Debate over how existing and emerging BCI technologies
may be used in conjunction with moral enhancements is useless if those moral
enhancements cannot be developed simultaneously. BCIs exist now, while moral
enhancements do not—thus the debate needs to shift focus to how policy can regulate
BCIs and other cognitive enhancements until, at the very least, realistic forms of moral
enhancement are available. Even still, moral enhancement may never be possible, thus
ethics needs to readily engage with how BCI enhancements can be put to benefit those
who most need them, and to avoid exacerbating inequalities.

3.4

Applied Ethics

There is a major downfall in transhumanist literature: a severe lack of practical ethics. It
is clear that a multitude of problems may stem from allowing the smartest humans to
become extraordinarily intelligent by coupling their brains to BCI enhancements—
anything from giving them competitive advantages in business to extending their memory
beyond normal expectations and in doing so, setting even higher standards that
unenhanced individuals cannot contend with. The exact ways these BCIs may worsen
existing inequalities is vague, and encompasses a variety of hypothetical situations. As
I’ve shown so far, strictly hypothetical scenarios for the future are not entirely the best
way the approach ethical dilemmas that exist today: simply put, we cannot focus on
purely conceptual understandings of BCIs—and particularly idealistic futures of

370

Young et. al. referenced in Roy Hamilton, Samuel Messing, and Anjan Chatterjee, “Rethinking the
Thinking Cap: Ethics of Neural Enhancement Using Noninvasive Brain Stimulation,” Neurology 76
(2011): 189

90

affordable, safe and reliable BCIs available to all humans—when there exist countless
tangible problems that need addressing today and in the near future.
BCI development is speeding up as technology—in terms of both the hardware
and software—while simultaneously experiencing growth in the number of groups and
individuals pursuing BCI research. BCIs, both for military and medical use, are quickly
becoming a reality. However, outside of the research done towards therapeutic BCIs,
such as the ones used for ALS patients, a considerable number of devices and software
systems are developing outside of the realm of medicine. At present, they are
predominantly non-invasive BCI systems, such as systems that use EEG-caps. These
devices are complex and cumbersome, but are clearly becoming more sophisticated and
affordable.
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As the hardware becomes smaller and more accurate, the devices

themselves become less obtrusive and obvious, and are more likely to be desired by the
general public; people are far more likely to use a tiny Bluetooth earpiece to use their
cellphone hands-free than they are to wear a large headset, even if that headset is
considerably cheaper. If a BCI were to be as easy to use as a Bluetooth earpiece, it seems
obvious portions of the population would want them. Private companies stand to gain
enormous profits from mass producing BCIs, especially when considering the World
Economic Forum named BCIs as one of the top emerging technologies in 2014.
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BCIs

are undoubtedly developing to enhance those who can afford them, in one way or
another.
The problem with BCI development, as it is currently happening, is that BCIs are
sidestepping ethics, policy and law to a considerable extent. While many debate the
ethics of cognitive enhancement, BCIs are wrongfully lumped in with other forms of
cognitive enhancement, namely genetic engineering and pharmaceuticals. These three
primary technologies for cognitive enhancement are discussed in two ways by both
transhumanists and bioconservatives: first, that cognitive enhancement proposes ethical
challenges regardless of the method by which that enhancement is achieved. The
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outcome is broadly labeled as enhancement, as thus some argue should be treated as one
subsection of human enhancement in general. But the methods and technologies
producing cognitive enhancement vary radically, both in how they are to be used,
distributed, and developed. The second way these three cognitive enhancement
technologies are discussed is that genetic engineering and pharmaceutical enhancement
pose serious risks to human biology of humans and especially the brain—BCIs are an
afterthought, thrown into numerous texts about cognitive enhancement with only a brief
mention. There exist only a small number of texts that deal with the ethics of BCI
enhancements directly, much of which only broadly survey the technologies and their
speculative future uses.
The most troubling aspect of lumping BCI enhancements with genetic
engineering and pharmaceutical interventions is that these technologies develop in
different sectors: genetics and pharmaceuticals are developed by medical doctors,
geneticists, biologists and chemists, all of which fall into the realm of medicine. As a
result, they are subject to rigorous testing for their safety and efficacy, and are evaluated
and regulated by federal governments. While this system may not be perfect, it does still
take considerable action in controlling technologies that may be abused by certain
individuals and groups. They are also subject to ethical evaluation, both in how they are
developed as well as how they may be distributed. These ethical deliberations influence
policy and law, and help prevent radical disparities between individuals from worsening;
one cannot simply pick up a bottle of Adderall and enhance themselves beyond
normative levels without a prescription. This type of regulation is engrained into all
medical innovations. Such controls are precisely what do not govern BCIs, in that some
BCIs are developed for medicinal purposes, many are not. They are created by engineers,
computer scientists, and designers, and so long as they do not require surgery or alter
human biology in any direct way, they avoid medical ethical evaluation and regulation
altogether.
As I’ve shown, BCIs pose serious risks to both individuals and society at large,
and demand ethical discussion. Transhumanists, as forerunners advocating for human
enhancement, often group BCIs with all other forms of cognitive enhancement,
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particularly when it comes to the ethical questions they raise. There are however rare
moments when BCIs are treated as separate from other forms of cognitive enhancement.
Unfortunately, the types of ethical questions raised are confined to how posthumans may
use them, and to specific scenarios like a waiter accessing information about dinner
373

guests without notice.

The ethical discussions amongst transhumanists is not where it

needs to be, nor is it heading in that direction, as the purpose of ethics is to inform policy
and law. There is absolutely no attempt by transhumanists to approach BCIs from a
practical standpoint, and to propose any sort of regulatory policy. Transhumanists are
amongst the most informed on the philosophy of cognitive enhancement, and occupy a
tremendous vantage point from which to influence policy makers and BCI development
before it gets out of hand. Yet they make no attempt to do so. The imagined situations
BCIs may produce in the future has no apparent impact on the development or regulation
of BCIs are they develop today.
The only proposal for policy and regulation—for really any kind of
enhancement—comes from Allen Buchanan who while he isn’t a transhumanist, is
prominent in the human enhancement debate. He argues that HETs are undoubtedly
coming, and will in many ways worsen current injustices. These technologies, if left
unchallenged, will provide the wealthiest with further opportunities to manipulate others
and amass more resources for themselves. He thoroughly deliberates over the ethics of
human enhancement (although only briefly about BCIs) and concludes that what is
necessary for the debate now is to move towards practical application, namely, to
enacting regulatory policy.
His proposal is to build an international committee, not unlike the United Nations,
that will focus entirely on evaluating and regulating any form of human enhancement. He
sees that the bioconservative argument to ban enhancements is implausible, in that a ban
in one country simply persuades development to happen elsewhere, and so long as
humans want to develop these technologies, they will find a place that allows them to do
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so. Instead, he argues that this ethical committee, which he names the Global Institute for
Justice in Innovation (GIJI), would oversee all developments no matter what country and
state they are in. While I applaud his proposal, I believe it shares some of the same
pitfalls of attempting a global ban in that it would firstly require all nations to consent to
a single regulatory institution. This alone is a daunting task, but without global
compliance, the GIJI may amount a body that hopes to police sovereign nations that
disagree about particular HETs. Furthermore, this type of institution, by including the
opinions and ideologies of all the world’s nations, may severely slow down the
development of HETs. It would appear to be very similar to the bioconservative argument
for the precautionary principle, in that no technology should be used until all of its
potential risks and benefits are understood. Such a ban will not work as there is no way of
fully predicting how technologies may be used. Buchanan’s proposal, while on the right
path towards ethical discussion and regulation, is massive in scale, and without
significant political support may never come to fruition.
One of the roadblocks to serious ethical debates over the different types of
cognitive enhancements is transhumanism itself, and the reputation it has built.
Transhumanists are in many ways technocratic, ignorant of numerous probable negative
outcomes, and even contradictory; while they advocate emerging technologies will lessen
inequality, many prominent transhumanists have considerable financial stakes in
corporations whose research either directly or indirectly lends itself to human
enhancement, such as Max More’s life extension company Alcor. The success of HETs
will make certain transhumanists—as well as pro-human enhancement advocates like
Kurzweil—obscenely wealthy. People have taken notice of the trend’s disadvantages, and
it’s no surprise that academics greet transhumanist arguments with hesitance.
Transhumanists have a reputation that clouds over the salient aspects of their ideology,
namely, that HETs are almost assuredly going to play a significant role in the future of
humanity. Debates over the ethics of cognitive enhancement, particularly with regards to
BCIs, needs to move away from insubstantial theories and towards the seriousness of BCI
enhancement. Furthermore, the debate also needs to pull away from bioconservative
arguments about offending the natural order of things and human nature, as these types of
arguments want to preserve the status quo, and are a slippery slope towards treating all
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innovation with severe hesitance and hostility. The argument to “leave well enough
alone” would suggest that any technologies that improve life are undesirable. For radical
bioconservatives using artificial organs or even taking blood pressure medication may be
problematic, let alone accepting emerging technologies, their ethical evaluation and
regulation.
Less radical bioconservatives also muddle the debate over HETs by steering the
conversation towards discussions of human nature. Philosophers have debated what
constitutes being human for centuries, and no definitive conclusion can yet be given.
Concepts of human nature may be helpful in informing ethical considerations, but they
cannot be the primary reason to not pursue human enhancement, as they tend to lead
towards increasingly complex notions of the human that pull further away from achieving
any sort of practical consensus on how to take action. Endless philosophical debates
ignore the fact that BCIs are developing now, and that regulation is best done prior to
technologies of any kind becoming accepted. We cannot wait for a concrete definition of
what constitutes human nature—whether it is wholly determined by our biology, by some
religious or spirirtual concept of a soul, or somewhere in between. BCIs require ethical
evaluation and action sooner rather than later, as do all human enhancements.
It is clear many BCIs are developing outside of medicine, as companies like
Google hold intensive BCI-development workshops, and small BCI developers are
routinely funded by DARPA. Some may argue that this technology is outside of
medicine, and thus outside of medical ethics and regulation, because BCIs—especially
invasive implants—are merely a superficial shift from holding a device to more
intimately tying it to oneself. Such an argument sees that technologies like computers
have increasingly become smaller, more affordable, transportable, and commonplace,
from having large mainframe computers housed in entire rooms, to exponentially more
powerful handheld devices. The shift from using a computer or device by holding it and
typing, to using your thoughts to do the same sorts of things, is insignificant from an
ethical standpoint: people are still accessing information and communicating with others.
The method by which they do these things does not matter, and does not require serious
ethical discussion or regulation.
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I have to wholeheartedly disagree: BCIs provide unique advantages to those who
have them, and others, even with access to the same information systems and ways of
communicating, cannot compete with on a level plane. Networking an individual’s mind
to external devices and systems undoubtedly alters social and professional relationships.
It will depend on the particular type of BCI to determine in what ways these changes may
occur, but there will be change nevertheless. BCIs need to be approached with
precautionary measures, which for the most part they are not.
Some argue that humans have always extended their natural abilities—whether
physical or cognitive—through the use of external technologies. Andy Clark holds that
even writing has allowed humans to extend their memory, which would lead to
suggesting that BCIs are just the next step in a long history of extending human
capacities. Along with this, many argue that therapeutic technologies may be used for
enhancement, and that the line between therapy and enhancement is blurry at best—if not
completely nonexistent. While I agree the difference between restoring individuals to
normative levels of cognition and enhancing cognition is vague, it is an important
difference to make. Policy and law cannot function without at least attempting to draw
lines to distinguish one from the other, so arguments that humans have always enhanced
themselves or that enhancement and therapy are increasingly blurred do not help when
approaching policy enactment. These are arguments to take into consideration, but ethical
regulation needs to draw whatever distinctions are possible.
Because BCIs are developing outside of medicine, it appears to me that the best
course of action is to firstly move the discussion of BCI-type enhancements outside of
transhumanism, to stop lumping BCIs with all other forms of cognitive enhancements,
and to seriously engage with BCIs on their own. These ethics need to deal with not only
the problems of how BCIs should be best distributed to citizens, but also with the
questions of how free-market capitalism will influence who has access to BCIs.
Furthermore, these ethical discussions need to address the fact that government and
military organizations are increasingly swalllowing BCI development companies,
effectively giving them a monopoly on BCI research, and allowing them to steer that
research towards particular sets of goals, including warfare. The politics of BCIs need to
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be flushed out into public discourse to best allow citizens to decide democratically how to
approach cognitive enhancement. There needs to be policy that pushes for a more
intimate tie between the developers of emerging technologies—engineers and computer
scientists—with experts dealing with the philosophy and ethics of human enhancement,
namely, academics. Literature on the ethics of cognitive enhancement needs to be moved
outside of academia and focused on influencing how BCI designers approach their
work—this may altogether avoid developing BCIs that threaten to worsen inequalities.
By increasing communication between developers and ethicists, we can raise the socialconsciousness towards how emerging technologies will have an impact on humanity, and
make the transhumanist idea of a better world through human enhancement more of a
possibility. While transhumanists may be at times too dramatic, they are correct in
insisting that cognitive enhancement will radically shape the future. Careful ethical
discussion, along with policy formulation and increased education of the public on the
risks and benefits of HETs, may very well foster a better world.
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Conclusion
This thesis has examined the formation and ideology of transhumanism—along
with its ethical implications—with a focus on enhancing human minds through electronic
devices. I have shown that the brain-computer interfacing (BCI) industry is rapidly
growing, and that it’s highly plausible that in the near future humans may use these
technologies to enhance their normal cognitive levels. These three chapters, when taken
as a whole, demonstrate that there are considerable ethical problems with BCI
enhancements, which are sadly missing from discussion thus far. My attempt is to bring
to light this deficiency in hopes of pulling the debate towards developing and enacting
proper regulation and policy for BCI enhancements.
For the majority of the time I spent researching and writing this thesis, I tried to
be as objective as I could be. Transhumanism gets a bad reputation at times, but I don’t
believe that many of the objections I’ve heard from my colleagues and in popular media
are aimed at the right points. Transhumanists are optimistic, yes, but they are also
cautious. Even scholarly articles I’ve come across make claims and assumptions about
transhumanism that are simply not true, and this only exacerbates the problem:
transhumanists are not seeking a “perfect human,” nor do they envision a perfect world in
the future. Instead they look to emerging technologies as a crucial element in perpetual
improvement, both for individuals and for society at large. Many of them argue that
technology requires strong policy and democracy in order to best serve the future of
humanity, and I believe they are right. They are however too technologically
deterministic, arguing that technology will be what leads humans to a brighter future,
with social and political structures as more of a supporting than leading feature. Their
bioconservative opponents point out the faults of transhumanism quite well, showing
where transhumanists too readily leave behind evidence-based arguments in favor of
speculation. But bioconservatives too have their weaknesses, especially when it comes to
issues of enacting a global ban on enhancements—as I’ve shown in Chapter One, a ban
just isn’t possible. Human enhancement through the use of technology has in many ways
been ubiquitous throughout human history, and banning development for the sake of
preserving the status quo will in all likelihood not happen in all areas of the world
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simultaneously—research will take place wherever it is permitted. Chapter One of this
thesis should serve as a survey of the debate landscape, and demonstrate how
transhumanists and bioconservatives, while not the only two groups involved in debating
enhancement, are by far the most prolific. They take the discussion away from the
science community and into the realm of philosophy and theory, and make emerging
technologies seem relatable and realistic. These two groups play a huge part in
advocating for public education and engagement with human enhancement, and should
be taken very seriously.
Chapter Two was the most difficult section of this thesis to write, primarily due to
the fact that the overwhelming majority of academic writing about BCIs is confined to
scientific journals flooded with technical jargon that are hard to wade through for
someone with a humanities background. And this is precisely part of the problem I’ve
identified: BCIs, while often mentioned in transhumanist writing—and in human
enhancement debate in general—are rarely discussed from a non-technical perspective.
There is plenty of work done on how BCIs work, but very little to describe their role in
culture and society. Humanities scholars examine technologies in order to understand
how they shape, and are shaped by, the society that surrounds them. There are entire
faculties devoted to understanding technology from a cultural and critical perspectives,
yet there is little written about BCIs. With such little attention given to such a powerful
technology, BCIs are avoiding all sorts of public and academic engagement. As Chapter
Two demonstrates, BCI technology is progressing rapidly, in the hands of medical
researchers, military-owned developers, and by relatively small technology companies
looking to make commercial products. Unlike other forms of cognitive enhancement, like
genetic engineering and pharmaceuticals, which develop entirely within medicine and
science, BCIs are appearing in multiple areas of development at once, with each field
raising different sets of ethical questions.
Chapter Three serves as an exploration of how BCI enhancements are being
treated at present. My research shows that they are almost always mentioned as an after
thought, or as being no different than other types of cognitive enhancement, when this is
simply not the case. BCIs, and particularly those developed as commercial products, pose
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serious risks to social, economic and political structures, and need to be given serious
attention. If BCIs do not undergo rigorous ethical evaluations, they are liable to enhance
those who can afford them, allowing the wealthy to utilize a serious competitive
advantage over unenhanced people, furthering the gap between classes. As with anything,
it is better to err on the side of caution and keep BCIs highly regulated until their risks
can be better understood, rather than to try to regulate them once they’ve already gone
into use.
This thesis should serve as a warning to how BCI enhancements may slip through
the cracks of regulation. Transhumanists advocate for their development and use in order
to elevate human cognition, with most transhumanists pushing towards at least some sort
of policy. It is not altogether impossible that enhancing human minds through BCIs may
result in smarter people who may be able to innovate better technologies and better
policies to improve quality of life across the world, and transhumanists agree. However,
this cannot happen if BCIs are allowed to continue on their current path. My hope is that
this oversight into BCI development can be corrected sooner rather than later.
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